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

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Dr. Harold C. Urey, a top-ranking atomic scientist who invented the method for separating uranium isotopes, looks upon the future of American atomic research with a combination of skepticism and fear.

Professor Frederick Seitz, who was responsible for key guides for the use of materials in atomic pile construction, shares the pessimism of his distinguished colleague.

UNW correspondents from Tokyo to Montevideo, from Oslo to Delhi, disclose the feelings and reactions of men and women around the globe to the start of Chapter II in the atomic age.

Ellsworth Raymond, former research analyst at the US Embassy in Moscow, points out that nobody should have been surprised by the fact that the Russians developed an atomic bomb.

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Dr. Franz Alexander, renowned psychoanalyst, appraises the effect of Russia's control of atomic energy upon the emotions of modern man.

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for OCTOBER 1, 1949

Before me, a notary public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Louis Dolivet, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the President of UNITED NATIONS WORLD, INC., and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations), printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

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(Signed) Louis Dolivet
President

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 14th October, 1949. ELSIE KILIAN

(My commission expires Mar. 30, 1951)

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I would like to send subscriptions to UNW, but it is very difficult to get dollar grants even for American newspapers and magazines, hence all the readers of American journals subscribe through the British news agents. I may also add that American magazines are received here very late. Sea-mail facilities are very poor.

As a businessman I would also point out that during the war the governments of East African territories introduced many controls which are still in existence today and blocking the trade. Plainly speaking, there is nothing like free trade or enterprise in this country. Practically all the trade is controlled by the governments or monopolized by the few privileged British firms.

J. K. Radia
Mombasa, Kenya

HOLLAND

We receive your magazine for our library and can tell you we greatly appreciate it. Therefore, if we now make a critical remark regarding the September number it is not because we wish to criticize but, on the contrary, because we regret that one of the photos reproduced might give a wrong impression.

In the article "Sugar Can Help World Stability," by Dr. Prio Socarras, a photo shows a primitive sugar cane press on a farm in Sumatra. There is no sugar cane grown in Sumatra . . . so this photo is out of place. We hope you will not mind our making this remark.

Ir. W. Spoon
The Royal Institute for the Indies
Amsterdam

SWITZERLAND

In these days, one is almost forced to take some interest in world problems. I trust that women will also be allowed to take part in world affairs, although in Switzerland we are not permitted to vote. We are, however, allowed to pay taxes!

B. Heer
Zurich

INDONESIA

I would like to subscribe to your magazine, but there is still the dollar problem in our country—there is no exchange at all. My suggestion as to how to improve your magazine is to write something about Indonesia, or something cultural.

S. Fouad Almassawa
Batavia

ITALY

It is my belief that museums and libraries should have a more lively role in educational life. My favorite idea is "bilingual education to bridge the gaps between the nations." If carried out, this idea could go far toward bringing peoples together. By speaking foreign languages, by seeing matters from another's point of view, the linguist is better able to understand and appreciate his foreign neighbor. Projects such as this, I feel, should be the new role of museums and libraries, and Ambrosiana is working to this end.

E. Turcotti
Ambrosiana Library and Art Gallery
Milan

JAPAN

The readers of our publication, World and We, and members of our association are greatly interested in your magazine, and particularly the article "What Gromyko Told Stalin," (UNW, June) which we have translated and published in our paper.

Seiichi Yamagata
Editor, World and We
Tokyo.

DENMARK

As editor of international politics of a conservative press agency in Denmark, I want to express my gratitude for receiving your excellent periodical regularly. It means a lot for my international orientation, and I indeed admire your always topical and well-written articles.

Harald Holder-Ericksen
Den Konservative Generalkorrespondance
Copenhagen

INDIA

"Asiatic Hobbyists" is an organization in India whose aim is to bring together people of all nations through correspondence. We have a club journal, a monthly publication, and would very much like to reproduce the article appearing in your August issue, "Let the Postman Ring," by George Kent. Reprinting this article will bring home to our readers some encouraging facts about the advantages of pen-friendships, and I am confident many more will take up the hobby after reading your article.

Dhirubhai Mehta
Ghatkopar

UNITED STATES

At the present rate, the magazine is turning into a slick magazine which does not deserve the name of UN World. I could never understand why there couldn't be feature articles devoted to each of the continents, especial a regular monthly feature about Latin America. In your utmost devotion to the cold war, you are not doing justice in trying to promote peace through understanding and information about the various members of the UN. The cover page of the magazine bears me out in my present disappointment. Please return to the full page (cover) picture which always had universal appeal.

Michael Yuhas
Paramus, N. J.

We are very happy to inform you that the high quality of UNW has convinced us of the necessity to have the members of the Washington World Affairs Center benefit by your brilliant articles, world news coverage and vital information in international affairs. To that end, we have decided to recommend very strongly to our members who are not yet subscribers, that they become acquainted with your publication. Copies of each issue are available to members and the general public of Washington in the Center's library. Furthermore, the Executive Committee has decided that, with every new or renewed membership of $10 or over, the Washington World Affairs Center will extend gratis a year's subscription to United Nations World. Our best wishes for the continued success of your splendid effort in furthering knowledge of world affairs.

Myles Standish, Executive Secretary
Washington World Affairs Center
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Six Major Events Shake World Stability

Direct negotiations between East and West are virtually at a standstill. Since 1946 no conference between representatives of the East and West has achieved any complete agreement. Only an impartial above-the-battle mediator of Nehru's world stature has a chance to resolve the ten major conflicts, from Berlin to Seoul, which divide the East and the West. Supporters of the Nehru mediation idea point out that even if he did not succeed he would be able to fix moral responsibility for failure.

Nehru Proposed as Supreme Mediator Between East and West

Amid great secrecy, certain UN circles are preparing a crucial world diplomacy move as a supreme effort to allay and even abolish the explosive tensions between East and West. The idea is to develop discreet but powerful pressure on the current General Assembly to appoint Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India as supreme mediator between the Western and Eastern blocs.

The sponsors of this idea have decided not to approach Washington or Moscow on this subject for the time being. They do not want to convey the impression that any such negotiations have been conducted with the knowledge or approval of either side. Instead, they prefer simultaneous negotiations in due course. The psychological climate in Washington and Moscow is such that the consent of one before the other might endanger the success of the whole project. Hence, negotiations are at present limited to those in the UN who have never ceased to believe that, despite the grievous divergences between the East and West, a formula for peaceful coexistence, for territorial stability and economic cooperation could be found; and that binding agreements covering all three could be reached for at least 10 to 25 years.

The plan, in its present stage, would endow the Prime Minister of India with full powers to organize his mediation in whatever way he feels best to insure success. His instructions from the General Assembly would merely call for an effort to convince not only the governments of Washington and Moscow but also the allies of both, that if the whole UN concept is to succeed, it must achieve constructive cooperation between East and West.

According to the confidential plan, the UN should accord to the Prime Minister the broadest personal authority. He should be authorized to choose among the statesmen of the world the assistants he would like to have. The UN would also place at his disposal a special secretariat to help him carry through his task.

In the view of those now exploring this plan, Mr. Nehru would begin by making a survey of all the outstanding differences between the East and West as well as areas of agreement. He would analyze the various proposals made by each side to achieve a *modus vivendi.* He would try to work out a minimum program of accord, which he would then discuss with the opposing governments.

It is felt that public opinion all over the world would strongly support any such initiative. It is also felt that no man today is better placed and more qualified than Mr. Nehru to undertake such a gigantic job. First of all, Mr

Nehru's country, which has just won its independence, is in the forefront of those vitally interested in maintaining international peace. As one of the outstanding internationalists of our time, he is particularly equipped, both on the basis of his intellectual achievements and his fundamental beliefs, to attempt a mediation mission unique in history.

Furthermore, advocates of the idea suggest that Prime Minister Nehru, fresh from the acclaim of his American visit, would also be similarly received in Russia. They further affirm that in view of his high standing all over the world, the Kremlin could not refuse to negotiate with him. The major difficulty foreseen at this stage is that Prime Minister Nehru might hesitate to undertake this task lest failure impair his global prestige. He would want to get some advance assurances that his mission would have a reasonable chance for success.

It would also be necessary for the UN to draft a resolution that would enable Mr. Nehru to act as a UN emissary rather than as the Prime Minister of India. Another reason assigned for any display of hesitancy on Mr. Nehru's part is that his presence in India is urgently required, especially in these critical times, when many economic, industrial, educational and political problems demand solution.

However, the Indian people and government might accede to his acceptance of this mission because of the pivotal importance it would give to India in world affairs, and the enormous prestige it would carry with it.

"Physical force need not necessarily be the arbiter of man's destiny. . . . Past history shows us the important part that physical force has played. But it also shows us that no such force can ultimately ignore the moral forces of the world, and if it attempts to do so, it does so at its peril." (Nehru)

East and West Reappraise Their World Strategy

A Roundup of UNW's Special Reports from:
London, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Helsinki, Stockholm and Rome

Diplomats around the world are re-appraising the major policies of East and West, as these are being transformed by such recent cataclysmic changes as the atomic explosion in Russia, devaluation of the British pound and 19 other currencies, the triumph of the Chinese communists and its impact on the rest of Asia, waning strength of the socialist parties in Europe, heightened USSR pressure on Yugoslavia, and the upsurge of fierce nationalism in both the Eastern and Western zones of Germany.

Many informed diplomats are convinced that these events are giving Soviet Russia, which has been on the losing side for the last 12 months, a decided advantage today which may or may not be permanent. Disclosure that Russia also has the atomic bomb has undermined the Western world's general feeling of security based on US monopoly of atomic weapons.

One immediate reaction to Russia's development of atomic energy has been the move by British and French cabinets to buttress the general defense plan for Western Europe. What London and Paris want most is a stock of atomic bombs in Europe, or at least in England. The French particularly insist upon a global military strategy which, in case of armed conflict, would prevent Soviet troops from over-running France and the rest of Western Europe.

To achieve this, the French feel that there must be the closest coordination between land, sea and air forces of the 3 major allies to lessen the brunt of the first assault upon France and to ensure active participation of other allied forces on the side of the French.

Devaluation and its repercussions are viewed with increasing concern. It is felt that Britain's unilateral action precipitated new economic difficulties for most of the European countries. A new inflationary trend threatens to upset

Recent developments which put cabinets on emergency schedules:

1. *Atomic explosion in the USSR*
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

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SOW *continued*

painfully achieved economic stability. Therefore, *an economic conference with objectives transcending the scope of the Marshall Plan is being discussed. Its purpose would be to free European trade from present currency and import restrictions that still impede complete recovery.*

The victorious sweep of the Communists in China is stirring new ferments in the rest of Asia, except for India and Pakistan whose governments are in complete control of the situation. Indonesian nationalists hesitate to make too many concessions to the Dutch, lest they risk a comeback on the part of the outlawed Communists.

In Indochina, which will soon have the Chinese communists at its borders, popular agitation, led by pro-communist Ho Chi Minh, is steadily increasing. The latest French effort to gain popular sympathy by restoring former Emperor Bao Dai to power has proved a complete failure. One reason is that Bao Dai totally lacks the people's sympathy. Another is that his nationalistic demands seem to the French no different than those of the Viet Nam, namely, practical independence, with French troops tolerated only to protect the regime.

French critics point out that the military burden of 120 million francs per day (or $320,000) is too heavy for the French Government at this time. They recall that England found a graceful way of getting out of the untenable situation in India, and believe that long before this France should have followed her example in Indochina. This proposal is not yet being officially expounded because it would mean a terrific loss of prestige for France and, above all, would greatly increase communist chances throughout Asia. The French might feel they have to consult with the other Western allies on a solution which would not add this new strength to Asiatic Communism since the problem involves the balance of forces not only of France, but also of the whole Western world, in relation to Russia.

In Europe, a phenomenon which is being carefully weighed is the progressive loss of strength by the Socialists. Except in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, most of the socialist parties are losing ground. Even non-socialists fear that this elimination of Socialists as a major political factor might swell communist ranks. Most observers do not believe that workers who are disillusioned by the Socialists would go into the right-wing parties.

The Yugoslav situation is the most explosive in Europe. The conviction is gaining ground that the Soviet Government will do everything in its power to destroy the Tito regime, because his heresy threatens to undermine the very foundations of the communist world. It is increasingly felt that the major Western powers must have a clear-cut policy toward Yugoslavia, to make Russia aware of the force that will confront her if she should resort to open action against the Belgrade regime.

Regarding Germany, European chancelleries are convinced that its present division into two States which today is a political and economic reality, will tomorrow become a military reality. Despite all the clamor for unification, high diplomatic observers are convinced that the world has to deal with two Germanies, twins in this: that each stands for extreme German nationalism.

The nationalistic language used by political parties in both Germanies is deeply depressing to those European countries which at regular periods have suffered from pan-Germanism and militarism.

It is pointed out privately that, in the new Bonn parliament, some deputies already are using the language of their predecessors during the last days of the Weimar Republic. What frightens even some members of the British Mission to Germany (the British have always favored an independent German Republic) is the failure of the majority of the new German deputies to oppose the neo-fascist tendencies of Germany.

In Eastern Germany's self-appointed Peoples' Congress, communist ideology, rather than stamping out nationalism, uses it for its own purposes. Eastern Germans, it is true, recognize a war guilt; but it is considered the guilt of another Germany, not their own—a Germany that no longer exists, and therefore cannot be punished. And for this new Germany they are asking all rights and privileges even for those who have exchanged the nazi swastika for the hammer and sickle.

UNW correspondents everywhere in Europe report a new sadness in the eyes of the people. The common man is again profoundly disturbed. He had thought that, after all these years of suffering, a measure of economic stability and peace would be achieved.

Today, his beliefs are shaken once more. He is almost in the same state of mind as in the last days before World War II. It is this feeling of a new insecurity which has already expressed itself in France's parliamentary crisis—a crisis which may spread to the whole of free Europe. The Third Force, which comprises political leaders who are determined to fight against both the extreme right and the extreme left, foresees the danger that this pervasive anxiety may prove to be fertile ground for the propagandists of either radicalism or reaction.

Finns Dread Stalin's Death

Key Finnish statesmen hope that, in the interests of world peace, Stalin will live a long time and continue to be the decisive force in Soviet politics. Contrary to views expressed in other chancelleries, Finnish leaders do not believe that his death would in any way lessen the USSR's present policy of toughness or provoke any internal revolt against it. Rather, Finnish leaders who have had frequent dealings with the Soviet Government are certain that the Stalinist succession—whether it takes the form of an individual premier or a ruling triumvirate—is likely to follow an even more truculent line toward the rest of the world than the one Stalin has largely molded and carried out.

The Finns base this conviction on

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their own experience and observations. The Finnish Government, during recent years, has been forced on several occasions to ask the USSR for partial relief from the severe reparations terms of the peace treaty the Finns signed with Russia in 1948.

The Finns know Russian psychology better than any other nation, if only because they were for centuries part of the Russian empire. Hence, the Finns have been very careful in all their diplomatic contact with the Russians, and especially in their requests for relief in reparations payments, to phrase everything in a way that would not offend the extreme sensitiveness of Soviet leadership and, above all, not convey the impression that they were trying to benefit from the rift between the East and West.

The Finns did obtain some concessions. On December 31, 1946, the Prime Minister of Finland, Mr. Pekkala, made public the Soviet agreement with his country which granted to the latter transit privileges through the Porkkala enclave and the Saima Canal. A year and a half later, on June 3, 1948, Russia made a slash in the amount of reparations still due to the Soviet Union, thus saving the Finns about $75 million. Finnish circles contend that Mr. Stalin himself was primarily responsible for these concessions, because he displayed a benevolent attitude toward Finland.

Mr. Stalin, like the other members of the Politburo, would like to see a stronger communist representation in the Finnish Government. He is, however, more aware than his colleagues that a fierce love for independence characterizes the Finn.

Current Finnish opinion is that Mr. Stalin's long stay in power has been marked by a moderation and a comparative magnanimity not to be found elsewhere within the Politburo. This does not mean, the Finns point out, that his ultimate aims are less revolutionary than those of other Politburo members. It means simply that in his unassailable position he can afford to indulge an occasional inclination toward mildness.

Stalin can permit himself to be generous and conciliatory without risking criticism by his top associates. But other Politburo members, no matter how potent, are constantly exposed to the danger that one day they will be accused of having made far too many concessions to the "enemy."

The first two years after Stalin's death, the Finns are convinced, Russian foreign policy will become particularly tough, since the new men in possession will want to prove that they are true Bolsheviks and immune to softness and compromise. The period immediately after Stalin's death will therefore contain some special pitfalls for world peace. The Finns are also persuaded that Mr. Stalin's death, even though it will have a tremendous psychological impact on the Russian people, will not be likely to precipitate civil war, or a showdown struggle between various factions trying to take over power. The Finns feel that the discipline inside the Communist Party, coupled with a systematic secret police network, would not leave any room for large-scale political conflicts within the USSR. They expect that the Politburo will, promptly after Stalin's death, announce the new top leadership, and that automatically tens of thousands of meetings of express loyalty to it will be held throughout the Soviet Union.

The President of Finland, Mr. Paasakivi, who has been chief negotiator of the armistice with the Soviets, has maintained cordial relations with the Kremlin.

When the government of present Socialist Premier Karl Fagerholm—anti-communist leader—recently broke up communist-led strikes, despite attacks in the Soviet press, the Finnish Government remained serene. It had been encouraged too much by the courteous tone of official Soviet-Finnish exchanges, New Year's messages and other greetings between Premier Stalin and President Paasakivi to worry about Pravda editorials.

(Advt.)

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

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The Tourist's Marshall Plan

By BIRGER NORDHOLM,
Chairman, Representatives in America of the European Travel Commission.

RENOUNCING individual competition for the coveted dollars of the American tourist, the 16 Marshall Plan countries have formed a European Travel Commission to promote their travel collectively.

According to Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, US travel expenditures should create more than $1,000,000,000 in exchange per year, and Europe is determined to get at least one-fourth of that amount to help her convalescent economy.

The representatives in the US of the European Travel Commission have worked out a nation-wide program to generate mass travel during the fall and winter, for they believe that their best chance to accelerate tourist activity is to send groups of travelers across the ocean during what traditionally have been "off seasons."

The Travel Commission is working to simplify passport and visa regulations and customs and exchange practices and thus satisfy the chief demands of the American tourist.

In the United States, the Commission has set up a collective fund for advertising and promoting its program. The preliminary amount is $100,000 to be followed by a sizeable budget of $1,000,000.

The Commission, which comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, has a double objective: to bring home to the people of many nations the inescapable fact that today's world is a small world, growing smaller every year; and, at the same time, to assist European economy under the Marshall Plan.

In its effort to increase travel to Europe, the European Travel Commission is emphasizing the fact that during the fall and winter a trip abroad costs much less than many people realize. Inexpensive accommodations are more readily available now than at any other time of year. In addition, trans-Atlantic crossings can be made at lower rates and on shorter notice.

In its desire to increase travel abroad, the European Travel Commission is making a unique effort to assist people who are interested in purposeful trips, who want to travel to learn more about the world they live in, more about their own special fields of activity and interest.

BECAUSE Europe's age-old institutions of art and learning are open now, a trip abroad during the winter provides the traveler with an unusual opportunity for personal development—with a chance to broaden the horizons of his mind. Many people *are* interested in travel that will enrich their lives in this way—farmers, housewives, club women, labor union members, industrialists, students, and teachers. Such a list is far from complete, but it serves to point up the diversity of interests that may lie behind a European visit.

In the past several months, for example, groups of farmers have gone to Europe to look into European farming methods; labor union members have studied union methods abroad; industrialists have investigated European production methods. More such groups will be leaving during the months ahead.

For these people the European Travel Commission is making special arrangements to enable them to learn more about particular activities in which they are interested, and to establish intimate contact with their European counterparts. American groups who travel in Europe this winter for the purpose of studying various phases of European life and culture will receive full cooperation from government authorities.

This program will offer an unusual opportunity to a great number of Americans who can not afford a trip to Europe for pleasure alone, and to those whose interests do not prompt them to go abroad unless they can get to know the countries they visit more intimately than the usual sightseer. Now these people can travel economically at a time when Europe is at its normal best, when its universities and museums, its social and industrial institutions are open and active.

This winter Europe is preparing one of its most brilliant seasons. In every country world-renowned musicians, actors and playwrights will be before the public. Museums will present brilliant showings of famous painters and sculptors. Everywhere in Europe the diversified social and artistic life for which the old world is famous will attain a pre-war magnificence.

As a means of organizing this program for purposeful travel abroad, the European Travel Commission is currently making a survey in Europe of the educational, social, and cultural facilities in the 16 participating nations that will be of special interest to potential visitors. This material will be classified in such a way that travel agents in this country will be able to set up tours built around these fields of interest for groups and individuals, whether they are students or professional people who want to study in Europe, or less specialized groups with an interest in some particular phase of European life. This survey information will also be available to groups and to individuals who want it as a guide in planning their own trips. It will cover such diversified activities as arts and crafts, housing and city planning, social welfare, physical education, leisure time activities, inter-European cooperation and economic reconstruction, and all the other interests that make up the many-sided cultural life of the 16 nations.

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November, 1949

United Nations WORLD Magazine

Is An Atomic Blitz Possible?

A Famous Military Expert Gives A Surprising Answer to the Question Which Haunts Millions

By FLETCHER PRATT

author of "America and Total War," "What the Citizen Should Know About Modern War," etc.

THE RECENT bitter conflict between the US Air Force and Navy did not expose the core of the problem which so disturbs the world—the possibility of an atomic blitzkrieg by West or East.

The central question—can any major nation be rendered impotent and brought to quick surrender by atom bombs?—remains unanswered.

There is, in fact, no single and simple answer. A general and complex one, however, can be arrived at by a careful breakdown of the question and an objective study of historical and comparative data.

One can ask these basic questions:

Can atom bombing break the morale of a major power and force early surrender?

Can the industry, particularly the war industry, of a great power be so shattered by atom bombing in the first few weeks or months that continuation of the war becomes impossible?

Can the armed forces of such a power be destroyed, dispersed or otherwise deprived of military effectiveness by atom bombing?

Can atom bombs directed against communications wreak such havoc that a belligerent great power would be forced to capitulate?

Can the bombing of a seat of government, specifically Washington or Moscow, bring a quick surrender?

If the answer to any one of these questions is an unqualified yes, one must concede that an atomic blitzkrieg is possible. If the answer is negative, it will not be because there is any doubt about the military results of nuclear fission. Even the first crude bomb used on Hiroshima destroyed everything within the radius of a mile—including the people. At Bikini, though most of the ships remained afloat, they were so contaminated as to be useless for any purpose but scientific study. And the Bikini bomb was an early model, much less effec-

Is An Atomic Blitz Possible? *continued*

tive than those now being stockpiled by the US. With this in mind one is fully justified in asking whether any nation could stand up under attack with such weapons.

1. What of Morale?

It is at once apparent that the example of Japan, which surrendered after only two atom bombs had been dropped, does not set an unchangeable pattern. It is a matter of historical record that Japan was beaten before the bombs were dropped and its desperate Cabinet was seeking a way to get out of the war while preserving some of the face so important to the national tradition (UNW, August, *The A-Bomb Was Not Needed,* by Admiral Zacharias).

Even had public opinion been an effective force in Japan, which it was not, one must note the fact that the first two bombs came down on a people whose will to war had been sapped by malnutrition and a long series of military catastrophes. The daily appearance of American airplanes over their heads and American ships along their coasts was palpable evidence of defeat that demanded acknowledgment.

The only irrefutable conclusion one can draw from the Japanese experience is that the atom bomb is an effective weapon with which to convince a beaten enemy that further struggle is hopeless and futile.

What must be considered here is the psychological effect of atomic weapons at the beginning of a war, on a people who have experienced no particular privation and who possess the means to retaliate.

In Poland, in 1939 and afterward, the Germans used methods of destruction that were physically as effective as a number of atomic bombs and, because of their novelty, psychologically quite appalling. For instance, the destruction of Warsaw from the air was without precedent on that scale. It sent a chill of horror through the world. But it did not in the lea break the Poles' will to resist.

The same must be said of the Dutc though they had the example of Wa saw to prepare them for the shock o the sudden, deadly onslaught on Ro terdam.

One must also remark that the was no noticeable crumbling of th British spirit under the aerial blit krieg when it finally came—or of th spirit of Barcelona when it was bein bombed during the Spanish Civ War.

The V-2 rocket which was use against England in 1944—though new weapon of terrible effectivenes —likewise failed to arouse a defeati

ıood among the English.

More comparisons need not be cited ɔ establish quite soundly the assumption that the effect of the atom bomb s a psychological weapon is chiefly t the higher echelons of command.

One must add, however, that even f a nation's military and civilian eaders accept defeat by psychological threat, there is no guarantee that hose beneath them will do so. The 'oles did not agree with their government's surrender. Neither did the 'rench nor the Belgians.

It cannot be questioned, of course, hat the atom bomb can exercise a ertain amount of psychological pressure in the stages preceding war. A veapon whose potentialities have not een fully developed naturally does. 'he threat of air warfare exercised uch pressure when Mr. Chamberlain vent to Munich. But that is a political natter, only remotely related to the echnical question of whether an tomic blitz is tactically and technically feasible.

The main point, substantiated by he bomb's own history and its parallels, is that, once a war has begun, a trong nation is not likely to be reuced to mass terror and surrender, ither by the threat of the bomb or the omb itself.

?. *What of Industry?*

ıt the time of the Hiroshima explosion the statement was widely made hat 100 such bombs could have put ngland out of World War II. Almost everyone believed it then. But since that date there have been reasons for regarding this, or any similar assumption, with skepticism.

One reason for skepticism is the work of the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Germany, it found, had been hit during the war by the equivalent of 500 atomic bombs—but the production of essential war goods by German factories was cut by only 2.72 per cent until the Allied armies moved in and physically took the factories from the enemy.

Of course, the German bombing was a case of gradual saturation rather than a single stunning attack. It built up slowly enough for the Germans to conceal some factories, like Nordhausen, whose existence was never suspected until it was captured. Moreover, a certain amount of damaged German production facilities were recovered through repairs.

But one does not "repair" a machine, or a factory, whose only damage may be that it has been rendered radioactive. On the other hand, no nation can, or will, use atom bombs so prodigally as to contaminate as many factories as were damaged by high explosives in World War II.

Nevertheless, the gap is very wide between what the equivalent of 500 atom bombs failed to do in Germany and what would have to be done to knock out its industrial production.

The Germans also made an attempt to destroy industrial production by bombing England and, even without counting the losses they suffered in the effort, they achieved very little.



The Allied air attacks on industrial North Italy produced no important results.

American forces had almost complete control of the air over Japan during the closing months of the war but were unable to keep the Japanese from building planes.

It is possible to conceive of cases where concentrated atomic attack could destroy or contaminate an entire industrial area. But, because it is so far from factory to fighting front, the result of atom bombing an industrial complex could not achieve quick victory.

Rather we must see that the effects of atom bombing of industries would resemble those produced by that older weapon, the blockade, which operates through attrition, slowly and over a long period. It leaves the attacked party's immediate military potential untouched and permits him to counterattack. In a long, hard struggle, atomic attacks on industry might pay, but an atomic blitzkrieg which *begins* with steel mills will end with more krieg than blitz.

3. What of Armed Forces?

It is generally admitted, and it is obvious, that atom bombs can be used effectively only against relatively small targets. A massed fleet, as at Bikini, would provide such a target; and fleets in atomic war will, therefore, be dispersed. An army ordinarily does not offer itself as a massed target, and we can assume that armies

Is An Atomic Blitz Possible? *continued*

as such will not be atom bombed.

Military headquarters throughout World War II were valid targets of bombers. The airplane, by adding the vertical dimension to warfare, put generals into the front line. Enemy bombers eagerly seek out opposing headquarters because its destruction can produce disintegration among the forces commanded by it.

The US made a distinct and successful effort to get Admiral Yamamoto, and the Germans are said to have tried to get General Eisenhower during the Battle of the Bulge. In any atomic war, one can quite safely predict that important headquarters establishments will go underground where they will be relatively safe. Certainly no quick surrender is likely as a result of atom bombing of military targets.

4. What of Communications?

Only if the weight of the offensive is delivered against distribution does the case become favorable for atomic blitzkrieg.

When the Germans overran Poland the physical casualties of the defenders were relatively low, but the Poles were reduced to paralysis by the destruction of their means of communication and movement. Their troop formations could not get together when it mattered, and those that did manage to assemble could not obtain food and ammunition.

In the German attack on France it was much the same; and when the Allies landed in Normandy the most effective form of air attack was that which tore up railroads and destroyed the Seine River bridges, thereby inhibiting German troop movements.

The effectiveness of attack on transportation facilities is also measurable on the long-range, strategic scale.

The Allied bombing attacks on German submarine yards produced only slender results, but U-boat construction was gravely retarded by Allied bombing of railroads carrying parts and materials to the assembly plants.

Similarly Japan's ability to sustain its war effort was most crippled by the sinking of its ships and the mining of its harbors.

In an offensive against transport the atom bomb offers great possibilities.

The Allies kept hammering throughout the war at German railroad marshalling yards. It was worth the effort, many bombs and men and planes were required to put even one yard out of business. It was worth it even though, once a yard was knocked out, the effect was only temporary because of repairs and reroutings.

A single bomb could destroy everything in a big yard at one shot, and even if the area could be decontaminated and reconstructed it would take so much time and labor it probably would not be worthwhile.

Similarly a single bomb could put an airfield out of commission.

A single bomb could annihilate a great port. Bikini demonstrated that an underwater nuclear explosion would drench everything around with radioactive liquid and make the area unsuitable for human occupancy for months and years.

No one can deny that it is at least theoretically possible to paralyze a nation by a blitz atomic attack on its transportation system. But even that is not to say that atomic bombing of communications will win a quick victory. It would be of dubious value a the opening of an atomic war for tw reasons.

The first reason is that any bli attacker must be sure he cannot b counterattacked in kind. The capita mistake of the Japanese was that the missed the American naval aircra carriers. The capital mistake of th Germans was that they failed to knoc out the RAF.

The nature of the double error i not altered by the fact that in bot cases the counterstroke was somewha long in coming. An atomic blitz car not be conducted on any other bas than that of first of all destroying th enemy's war potential—not in ger eral but specifically. This means tha the blitz attacks must eliminate th enemy's stores of atom bombs, hi means of producing them, his mean of carrying what bombs he has t their targets.

The last of these involves airfield again. Because of their dual impo tance and the impossibility of cor cealing them, they would receive high priority as targets in any atomi blitz.

The location of most atomic pile is no secret, and they also would com in for early attack.

Discovery and destruction of ator bomb stores are more difficult. Th attacker would have to be quite cer tain that his intelligence services ha located all the stockpiles, and tha his attack would be sure to penetrat —by force or by guile—the heavy de fenses that would surround bot bomb stores and atomic piles.

The second reason an atomic blit against communications is unlikely i that the political effects cannot b fully foreseen. Modern war is no fought in a vacuum, or even in isola tion. And modern communication i the factor that makes this so.

An atomic blitz against any one na tion is certain to bring others int some sort of action—if only becaus being an atomic blitz, it is a grea and real danger to them. And not un less or until the lines of alliance be tween possible belligerents are un alterably drawn will it be possible t predict in advance what action Na tion C will take when Nation A begin

(Continued on page 60)

Two Great Scientists Speak Up Against Unreasonable Thought Control and for Freedom of Research and Discussion



The Future Of American Atomic Research

I. The Fatal Myth of "The Secret"

By HAROLD C. UREY

Professor of Chemistry, University of Chicago

PRESIDENT TRUMAN has stated that an atomic explosion has occurred in Russia. I take this to mean that either it is an atomic bomb or that the Russians are well on toward having a bomb. It seems that the Russians did not know the technical details in regard to the production of such a bomb four years ago, and hence the construction of a small plant which, in the course of four years, would produce enough material for one or two bombs seems to be an impossible assumption. It therefore appears that in the course of four years they have learned how to make bombs and have constructed substantial plants for this purpose. Nothing prevents them from building as many more as they wish. This leads to the conclusion that they can make a stockpile in a relatively short time. I should say about two years could and probably will see the lead of the US effectively wiped out.

The progress of atomic research in the United States during the past four years has not been satisfactory. We have been and are now in an atomic armaments race, and, since Russia was able to make the bomb in such a short time, it is obvious that she is making headway comparable to that which we made during the war. Our progress since has not been commensurate with the progress during the war in any sense. Most of the more prominent men, as well as many of the brilliant young men, left the projects to return to their university work, leaving the atomic energy laboratories with some good talent but not nearly as satisfactorily manned as they were during the war. This withdrawal from the laboratories was due to a natural desire to get back to academic work, but it was accentuated by other factors.

American Atomic Research *continued*

By all odds the most important of these has been the excessive concern of Congress, the military, and the public with "The Secret." It seems that the statements of scientists who produced "The Secret," and who presumably know something about it —and who, in fact, are the only people who know anything about it— have been ignored throughout this period. In spite of many statements on this subject over the past four years, apparently no progress has been made toward an understanding of the minor importance of that which Congress and public opinion regard as secrets. The scientists not only failed to convince Congress and public opinion of our prediction that the Russians would have the bomb in about five years after we had it, but, because we told disagreeable truths, we have even been accused of wishing to give up our progress either because we are impractical dreamers or because we are plain traitors.

Every man in the Atomic Energy Commission and every scientist in a responsible position in the atomic projects, even if he were a man of the highest intelligence and efficiency, is hampered or even paralyzed in his work if he must permanently be on guard to defend himself against ridiculous accusations of real or imaginary violations of petty security regulations or against charges of having Communistic leanings. It is not astonishing, then, under these conditions that the Atomic Energy Commission was not able to keep the services of many excellent scientists who have left the work in utter disgust.

I myself know of people who wished very much to work on atomic energy during the last four years and who found it impossible to be effective in this field in spite of the fact that they made outstanding contributions during the war. I think it is of the utmost importance that we realize now that the atomic energy program in th United States is inefficient at preser because it is frustrated by a mistake desire on the part of Congress an the public to protect us against th loss of "The Secret." This exceeding ly dangerous situation can only b remedied if we start to take a real istic point of view instead of tryin to find protection behind a scientifi Maginot Line.

I view the acquiring of bombs b Russia as exceedingly ominous. A the end of the war Mr. Michae Amrine and I published an articl entitled, "I'm a Frightened Man." Today I am as frightened as I wa in the years immediately befor World War II. I have a feeling tha the United States and western Europ are in much the same position toda as they were then.

Beyond this action to improve th effectiveness of the American atomi energy development, a bold politica program is needed to cope with thi situation created by the possession o atomic weapons by national states.

II. Security vs. Progress

By FREDERICK SEITZ

Chairman, Department of Physics,
Carnegie Institute of Technology

THE recent announcement of the Russian atomic explosion has surprised none of those scientists who participated in the American venture in this field and who had knowledge of Russian wartime developments in weapons. In the later stages of the war, the Russians developed and placed in mass production, in sufficient quantities to be highly effective, the best heavy tanks which were available to any of the nations participating in the war, including the Western Allies and Germany. The problem of developing an atomic bomb and placing this bomb into mass production is of comparable magnitude once one has the assurance of success provided by knowledge of the Hiroshima explosion and has the information released by the Manhattan District to provide a guide to the avenues along which success is to be expected.

There are many quarters in American life today in which an ostrich-like refuge is taken in the idea that the Russians will prove unable to cope with the problems of mass production associated with the bomb. I believe this is a completely vain and dangerous hope. While it is evident that they do not possess as vast an amount of industry as the United States, it is also evident that they possess representative segments of industrial knowledge and equipment. If this is devoted to the problem of the bomb, as is evidently being done there is no reason why their rate o progress cannot parallel or surpas our own, provided they have acces to the raw materials of the bomb which appear to be fairly widely dis tributed. It must be remembered tha we do not devote *all* of our industria outlay to the production of the bomb but probably only of the order of per cent. Even if the Russian indus trial outlay is only 10 per cent o ours, which is probably a large un derestimation, Russia can match ou present effort by devoting a tenth o it to the bomb.

The greatest danger we face a present is that the Russians will no surpass us in bomb production an

in other phases of the development of atomic energy. I believe that this is not a minor probability, but is actually a strong possibility. In 1940 the Germans possessed air supremacy on the basis of development which had taken place five years earlier. At that time they were completely confident that their accumulation of talents was so unique that it would be essentially impossible for any other nation to match them in the near future, let alone outstrip them. Yet that is precisely what the United States did in a remarkably short time. There is unfortunately a certain amount of analogy in the situation surrounding the field of atomic energy. In 1945 we possessed unquestioned supremacy in this field. Many public figures came to the conclusion at that time that this success was so intimately associated with factors that are essentially American that we could expect to retain this position almost indefinitely provided we just "kept the secret." This is almost precisely the German reasoning and it is subject to precisely the same danger.

It must not be forgotten that our machine for developing the field of atomic energy was all but stalled by the end of 1946. Although it is in motion again and contains in some quarters men of the highest ability, we have no assurance that it is moving with momentum comparable to that of the Russian machine. In fact there is a good chance that theirs is in swifter motion for they have been driven forward by a sense of acute urgency which we have lost since the end of the war. Much of our energy has been devoted to maintaining purely static features of our development and not to driving ahead into unexplored channels, as was characteristic of our wartime work and is probably true of present Russian work. This devotion to the static aspects of our development is made evident by the fact that *security* rather than *progress* is regarded as the matter of primary importance in the field by the leaders in such a large fraction of our public life. That attitude is very reminiscent of the French attitude between the two wars and the expression it found in the forts of the worthless Maginot line.

If we are to compete with the Russians in the field of atomic energy we must regain the dynamic state which we possessed five years ago and place progress uppermost in our minds. If all of the knowledge which we possess today were relegated to the absolute "security of the grave" so that it could not come to the eyes or ears of the prying Russian agent, the Russians would still come into possession of all of this knowledge in a relatively short time as the result of routine scientific and engineering investigation. It is far better that we focus attention on the acquisition of new knowledge and new techniques and run the small danger that some of this information will be obtained by the Russians before they discover it themselves than that we strangle our efforts by the perverted guarding of secrets which will automatically become of small value to anyone in due course of time.

At the present state in the cycle of events, I believe that the most conservative assumption to make, in lieu of positive evidence to the contrary, is that the Russians will soon be stockpiling fissionable material at a rate that is limited only by their access to raw materials. Any planning of the security of Western civilization which is based upon another premise can easily lead us into a disastrous tragedy.

(In Cooperation with the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists)

In the Next Issue of United Nations World:

UNESCO and Modern Man
By Jaime Torres Bodet, Director General of UNESCO

Starvation Can Be Stopped Now
By Pearl Buck

A Businessman's Report on the British Crisis
By H. J. Heinz II, President, H. J. Heinz Co.

Mademoiselle Sylvia—France's Most Romantic Mayor

Why They Confess at the Communist Trials

And Other Fascinating Inside Stories on Political, Cultural and Human Problems of the World

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The Blast Heard

UNITED NATIONS WORLD asked its correspondents 'round the world to report how the sudden beginning of the second phase of the atomic age was affecting people of high and low station in the various nations of five continents.

Our global survey disclosed a number of dramatic facts. There was no panic anywhere in the wake of President Truman's disclosure —no war hysteria, no fear of an imminent disaster. On the contrary, the majority of the people seemed to feel that possession of the lethal weapon by both major powers would reduce the chances of a final show-down.

Even more interestingly, from the reports it may be concluded that a weariness bordering on apathy is abroad in the world at large concerning the great problems of war and peace. In every single country, excitement over the devaluation of currencies far exceeded interest in the Bomb. Men and women seem to be saturated with propaganda and scare headlines, and are willing to concentrate only upon their immediate tasks and the problems which make up the texture of their everyday lives.

We present in the following pages a number of the most significant reports.

Istanbul, Turkey

There has been nothing here, absolutely nothing that might bear the faintest resemblance to the panic or at least the anxiety that would have stricken Paris on hearing that the Germans had the atomic bomb.

Yet, nobody on earth threatens or is able to threaten Turkey as much as Russia does. To ask the average cultivated non-communist Turk to find beauty in Russian music amounts to about the same thing as to suggest to a Jew he might listen with pleasure to the Horst Wessel Lied. Whenever a Turk, who is not a Communist, thinks of the Russians he either feels the surge of anger or a cold shiver runs down his spine.

Nevertheless, there has been little excitement about learning that the Russians are now able to wield the most dreaded weapon in the world.

I asked Fikri, my porter, what he thought of that news. In response, he offered a large grin, and when I inquired as to what his wife, our faithful Emine, thought of it— and whether she had expressed any opinion—an outrigh laughter broke through his restraint. After he had mas tered his merriment, he told me that neither he, who read his daily paper from the first line to the last and has hi own personal, independent opinion of the Governmen nor his much less lettered wife, had bestowed a singl thought on the so-called news of the day. As to his fello porters in the same street, none had as much as exchange a single comment with him on the subject.

For days, I have listened to conversations among Turki Certainly, they seemed excited. But was it about th atomic bomb? No. Those who were losing money as a con sequence of the devaluation of the pound sterling, wer insisting that the Government should devalue the Turkis lira to help them out of their quandary, while other vehemently expressed the contrary view. None spoke o the atomic bomb.

Why is that so? Why are the Turks not affected by th possibility of the Russians wiping out their main town by just throwing a few bombs?

Undoubtedly, the Turkish temperament—which is fata istic—as well as the attitude of mind—which consider that such questions are the job and the headache of th Government—may explain the lack of reaction. Als there is the ever present fact that popular feelings a seldom aroused in Turkey over such questions, unless th Government desires them to be so.

But, beyond that, there is the unconscious realizatio that atomic bombs are weapons to be used by and again giants only. Russian atomic bombs may well threate New York, Washington, and Chicago, but not Istanbu Ankara and Smyrna. World War III may no longer b won or lost on the Rhine or on the Anatolian platea Neither will the next war's Pearl Harbor be sought i Turkey.

When there was no Russian atomic bomb, the Turk were afraid of Russian armies rolling through Turke only to be rolled back by the Allies, in which proce whatever might be spared by the Russians was doome to be destroyed by the Allies. The Turks, therefore, i sisted on more and better arms, just to be able to war off the Russians. The advent of the Russian atomic bom obviously tends to modify the direction of strategic mov ments, and consequently to delay the immediacy of Ru sian onslaught on the Straits and across Anatolia in cas of war.

My young friend Nedjdet, a graduate of the Faculty o Law, and now active in journalism, said he believed th

'Round The World

Russians really had the atomic bomb and that this was good news since, for fear of reprisals, both sides would be cautious and a third world war thus not only be delayed, but maybe even averted. On the whole, his opinion is the one expressed by the majority of the Turkish press.

Emile Guéron

Oslo, Norway

The editorial printed in the Oslo daily *Verdans Gang* on September 24 excellently sums up thoughts and reactions of ordinary men and women here.

"A new situation has not been created," the newspaper declared. "The strategic balance is still maintained, since the bomb as such has never been regarded as a factor which alone could decide the outcome of a war."

Verdens Gang also interviewed one of the leading atomic research scientists, Dr. Gunnar Randers of the University of Oslo. "The news was no surprise to me," affirmed Dr. Randers. "What has happened corresponds exactly to the estimates made in 1945 to the effect that in 4 or 5 years, the USSR would be in a position to master the production of atomic weapons."

In the liberal *Dagbladet* of September 26, political analyst Ragnar Vold wrote:

"With regard to international control of atomic weapons, there is little advantage in agreeing to destroy atomic bombs if the bomb production plants are not destroyed as well. But even if this is done, the fear of war will not have decreased. There have been wars in the world long before the existence of atomic bombs, and it is not wise to focus all attention on abolition or preservation of atomic weapons."

Marie Lous-Mohr

Montevideo, Uruguay

The explosion of the Russian atomic bomb has made little impression on democratic Uruguay. Speakers, press, and government are more excited about the devaluation of the pound and other currencies, while the man in the street is largely unaware of both events. The physician in his club and the packing-house employee in his café may have brought up the matter the first day or two just to make conversation, but they would have attached little significance to it. Unless one of the parties present were a Communist, the conservation would be likely to turn almost at once to soccer or next year's Uruguayan election.

But if a Communist was present, it would come out that the United States, which had repeatedly rejected Russian overtures for peace, would now be willing to sit down around the green table and peacefully thresh out differences.

Unusual and penetrating was the Sunday morning editorial of the conservative *La Mañana:* "However absurd it may seem, we believe that the knowledge of this fact (that Russia has the atom bomb) may turn out all to the good for democracy. The supposed monopoly of the bomb could have become a dangerous security myth, a sort of Maginot Line, behind which the free countries, believing themselves protected from all danger, might have lost their capacity to fight, and they might have been careless about other fundamental aspects of their defense."

Dr. Dardo Regules, one of the leaders of Uruguayan political thought, and head of the Catholic Party, spoke for many with a perspective that refuses to limit its sight to the bomb:

"I am not worried about the atomic bomb; I am worried about the moral order. The atomic bomb does not alarm me; but I would be greatly alarmed were there a fall in the power of love. . . . I am confident that Christianity is stronger than atomic force."

Earl M. Smith

Tokyo, Japan

The average Japanese, the worker and the housewife, showed no significant reaction to Russia's possession of the atom bomb. Of course, the citizens of Nippon know what to expect from an atom bomb, whoever may happen to drop it again, but the postwar masses are much more concerned about their domestic woes. To name some of them: unemployment, high cost of living, tax revision recommended by the Shoup Tax Mission, Communism, and sterling devaluation which will curtail Japan's foreign trade.

Some random reactions showed that women are especially indifferent.

"We had enough of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," a middle-aged housewife commented. "We want our cost of living reduced. We wish our government would do something about it."

A white-collar worker pessimistically declared, "If Russia has the atom bomb, we might as well expect Japan to be wiped out!" Asked to elaborate on this, he merely remarked, "If Russia can't plant communism in Japan by legitimate means, she'll resort to anything and the atom bomb will do it."

An unemployed intellectual (and there are many of

them today) was more vocal and stated, "This means that the United States must remain in Japan indefinitely. Peace treaty is out of the question. Japan has renounced war in her Constitution. Will this remain a mere paper ideal? Surely the Americans are not going to let us down at this stage and let Russia grab defenseless Japan!"

Government sources, for reasons which are obvious, are refraining from making any comments. They have their hands full. As for international problems, Japan's hands are tied today.

Tetsuichi Kurashige

Rome, Italy

As to the personal opinions of the people-in-the-street, the housewife is too much preoccupied with the cost of living, the unemployment of her menfolk, the housing shortage, and the scarcity of schools for her children, to keep track of political problems. A professional woman, Dr. Maria Remiddi, President of the International Association of Mothers for Peace, said, "Undoubtedly the news is encouraging because it re-establishes a balance of strength. But we who are working for peace believe that peace cannot come from the parity of armaments, but from mutual understanding among the peoples and international cooperation." A housemaid, Miss Giulia Mizzi, at Viale Bruno Buozzi, made this precise comment: "They should stop all this talk about bombs and threats of war. We are sick of it all. One day they give us a hot bath and the next day a cold shower. What we need is work and bread, and homes for the people."

Anna Garofalo

Delhi, India

It is safe to say that the problem of atomic warfare has not penetrated below the surface of people's minds here. It is almost shocking, sometimes, to hear the levity of the tone with which the probability of a third world war is discussed, as if India would be quite unaffected. But this detachment—though it means that the ordinary housewife or worker would probably only gape with bewilderment if asked their opinion on Russia's possession of atomic bombs—also means that the papers can discuss the matter without passion or serious prejudice.

Thus, although strongly anti-communist, the *Hindustan Times*, the leading national paper in Delhi, whose Managing Editor is Devdas Gandhi, son of the Mahatma, printed the following middle-of-the-road editorial:

"So long as the United States alone had the atom bombs, debates in the UN General Assembly on the control of atomic energy had a tinge of unreality. The United States made it clear that the proposal of international supervision which she advocated would not mean any sharing of her secrets of production. If Russia refused to subscribe to the view, it was not surprising either. Not unnaturally, Russia seemed to hold that international supervision could only mean that the United States wou come to know where Russian atomic experiments we being located and what progress had been achieved the Now that both Russia and the United States have the ato bomb, Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal to ban atomic weapo cannot be dismissed as of old, as a Russian move to ma the United States tie her own hands."

Horace Alexander

Mexico, D. F.

On the day that President Truman announced that t USSR also possessed the atomic bomb, an aeropla crashed on the slopes of Mount Popocatepetl killi Blanca Estela Pavon, one of the brightest stars of t Mexican cinema, and a man who was considered as possible President of Mexico, Gabriel Ramos Millan.

In a country, like all those of Latin America, in whi interest in the outside world is limited to the groups intellectuals, politicians and businessmen, these ne events had the inevitable effect of diminishing the i portance of the "Truman bomb."

In the building where I live, there are 15 other tenant those on the lower floors, rich; those on the rooftops, d laborers, I took a "Gallup Poll:"

The three tenants on the low floors believe that t atomic bomb in the hands of Russia will hasten war.

Seven tenants (six on the middle floors and one on t rooftop) believe that it will postpone war.

One woman on a middle floor believes that Russia w have to be attacked immediately.

Four (two on the rooftop and two on middle floor hold no opinion. This cross-section corresponds appro mately to the social and intellectual structure of Mexic The proportion was maintained when I interrogat other people.

The most sensational thing that has been said in spect to the atomic bomb is an article in *Hoy*, the pron nent weekly, by the great novelist and diplomat Rub Romero, which asserts that when he was Ambassad of Mexico in Cuba, during the last war, "there p sented credentials as Ambassador a very well-known R sian personage, who in a visit of courtesy told me th President Roosevelt, in the meeting at Yalta, had shar the nuclear formula with his ally, Stalin. There are w nesses to my conversation with the Russian Ambassad in regard to which I rendered a confidential mem randum to the Government of Mexico."

Significantly, too, in Mexico, the conviction was wi spread that the USSR had the atomic bomb and w concealing it. A little while ago, it was discovered th Russian ships, coming from Vladivostok, made a stop Salina Cruz, and loaded up with boxes containing eart And the earth of Salina Cruz—used by the Indians make beautiful, multi-colored vessels—contains, acco ing to Mexican geologists, radioactive materials.

This fact, of little scientific value, made the "Trum bomb" not a cause of great surprise.

Victor Al

If the West Was Taken Unaware, It Was Its Own Fault

How The Russians Got The Bomb

By ELLSWORTH RAYMOND

Assistant Professor of Soviet Government and Economics, New York University; former Research Analyst, US Embassy, Moscow

IGHT years ago, in the flush of the first Nazi victories in Russia, dolf Hitler proudly proclaimed that had won the war in the East by pturing three-fourths of Soviet industry. Even though Hitler padded s statistics, half of the USSR's facries and mines actually had been t out of commission at that time. t the undamaged half of Russian dustry rallied and re-equipped the d Army which finally was to overelm the Wehrmacht. The fact is at despite lend-lease, the USSR won war with weapons mainly manuctured in Soviet plants from Soviet raw materials.

Perhaps this should have been a good object lesson in teaching the outside world never again to underestimate Soviet industrial strength. But the lesson wasn't learned. Industrialists, economic experts and diplomats from all over the globe were shaken and nonplussed when the first atomic explosion in Russia occurred in 1949, and not—as expected—in 1952 or later. Yet so fundamental a miscalculation must have had some reason for being, especially since everybody made the same mistake. Today we know that the fault lay less in the exaggeration of the difficulties of nuclear research and bomb production, than in the lack of knowledge of the USSR's growing mastery of modern technology.

It was generally assumed that the Soviet Union could not find sufficient uranium to make bombs, since several hundred tons are needed yearly and mines with so large a production are found only in the Belgian Congo and Canada. This was the first in a series of miscalculations. While it is true that the Soviets have no large uranium mines, they have a great number of small deposits, which—

How Russia Got the Bomb *continued*

taken together—could yield enough for bombs. Here is the formidable list of these known deposits:

1. The Fergana river valley of southeastern Soviet Central Asia where uranium has been mined since the mid-1920's. The biggest and oldest mine is called Tiuya-Muyun. Another important deposit in this area is near the town of Taboshar. When first discovered, the ore in this region seemed to have a metal content of less than 3 percent, but later findings disclosed veins containing 10 to 17 percent.

2. Gandza in the Caucasus has carnotite deposits similar to those in the US Rockies. The metal content is only 3 percent, but the deposit is larger than all those in Fergana combined. The western slopes of the Urals also have substantial carnotite reserves.

3. Scattered deposits of uranium intermingled with pegmatite are found in the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic north of Leningrad.

4. The former republic of Tannu-Tuva, hastily annexed by the USSR in 1946, has long been known to contain uranium reserves.

Aside from these sources of supply, there are at least three deposits the Iron Curtain countries of Easte Europe. Best known are the Joac imsthal mines in west Czechoslovak and those in German Saxony, bo of which Russia is working inte sively. Just after World War uranium was also discovered in B garia.

As if this were not enough, the are at least six deposits of oth radioactive minerals within Russia self. In the cold Soviet Arctic, grams of radium are extracted fro every kiloliter of waste water fro the Ukhta oil wells. Radium has al been found in the oil well water Krasnokamsk, in the west Ural foo hills. Thorium, a potential atom-bom explosive already under trial at t US Hanford plutonium plant, mined at Gorodok in the Buri Mongol Autonomous Soviet Repub in the Far East, the Leninogor mines in the Altai mountains mid-Siberia, near the giant Dniep Dam in the Ukraine, and not f from Tashkent in Soviet Centr Asia.

In brief, Russia has at least 14 d posits of radioactive minerals at disposal. Many are small, and mo have low metal content. This mea infinitely more total tonnage mu be mined than in the case of Con and Canadian uranium. But, inte sively exploiting these deposits eith with machines or masses of men, t USSR can certainly obtain sufficie material for some A-bombs, even the quantity is less than that of t United States. Moreover, with radi active deposits so widespread throug out the USSR and with "prospe ing" a crusade, still other reserv will eventually be found.

The second great miscalculati made by the outside world was th Russian scientists and technicia would be incapable of designi atomic fission plants. This assum tion was based on the facts th there are fewer scientists in the USS than in America, and that USS laboratory research has been spot and erratic—some very good a

KHARKOV. Evacuated high volta equipment being reinstalled after t war at the Physico-Technical Institu

some very bad. But let us examine the history of Soviet nuclear physics:

In 1939, experiments in Western Europe definitely showed that uranium could provide a chain reaction, which would release a hitherto unimaginable amount of power. Reports of these experiments spurred American nuclear physicists to begin a long series of research investigations which culminated in the atomic bomb. Meanwhile, Russia was far from napping. The USSR drew its own conclusions from Western European discoveries. As far back as December 31, 1940, *Izvestia*, the press organ of the USSR, pointed out:

"Next year, the youthful Soviet physics will study the uranium problem as one of its most fundamental problems. Separation of 'uranium-235' (explosive uranium) from common uranium is the goal. It is not only that mankind will receive a new basis for energy, a million times larger than all bases known till now. Not only will a new fuel arrive to replace exhausted reserves of coal and oil, and save industry from fuel hunger. It is that a new era of human might is commencing. Man will be able to obtain any amount of energy, and direct it toward any purpose."

These were no idle words. In 1940, construction of the most powerful cyclotron in Europe was begun in Leningrad. Even though manufacture of such an intricate machine requires great technical skill and craftsmanship, its parts were not imported from more highly industrialized nations. They were built in Leningrad itself by the Bolshevik, Russian Diesel, Electric Power, and Red Vyborger factories. At the same time, Moscow started to build an even more powerful cyclotron.

When Hitler's armies surged into Russia in 1941 they found that atomic experiments had been conducted at a laboratory near the Dnieper Dam, and at Kharkov, German Intelligence officers were astounded to find a cyclotron larger than any in Western Europe.

With the war's end, when atomic research became an international race at forced speed, the number of vast laboratories working on nuclear fission under the USSR Academy of Sciences compared in size and purpose to the Argonne and Brookhaven research centers in the US. These Soviet marvels include the Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow (headed by Peter Kapitsa, long one of the world's top atomic scientists), the Leningrad Physics Technical Institute, the Cosmic Ray Committee

How American Scientists Predicted The Russian Bomb

HAROLD C. UREY, in testifying before the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy on November 29, 1945:

"Of course my opinion as to how long it would be is a guess on my part, but I think that we should not think of a longer time than about 5 years."

IRVING LANGMUIR, in answer to a question put by Senator Tydings at the same Committee on November 30, 1945:

"I put three years as about the minimum. That is I put three years down if Russia really seriously devotes her attention to it and starts on a big-scale production."

DR. VANNEVAR BUSH, testifying before the same Committee on December 3:

"If Russia threw her full weight into it and if she imported freely those things which she does not herself manufacture adequately at the present time, then I think in 4 or 5 years she should have a plant in operation."

The following quotation is from The New York Times *of Oct. 31, 1947:*

"MAJ. GEN. LESLIE R. GROVES said today that the Russians would need 15 to 20 years to develop an atomic bomb if they did it in secrecy and without aid from the United States, Great Britain or Switzerland."

MOSCOW. THE NEW HOME OF KAPITSA'S INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL PROBLEMS.

How Russia Got the Bomb *continued*

(conducting experiments in the Caucasus and Pamirs), the Institute of Physical Chemistry, the Radiation Institute, the Isotopes Commission, and the Commission for Heavy Molecular Units.

But even if USSR scientists were alert and experienced, British and American atomic experts doubted that Soviet industry could build and equip atomic factories quickly. At first glance there seemed to be good reasons for this lack of confidence.

The United States, the most highly industrialized country in the world, needed three years to build its four giant factories to separate the explosive U-235 and plutonium from ordinary uranium. Britain, whose techniques sometimes surpass America's, planned to take five years for constructing its postwar plutonium plant. Since the USSR mines every known mineral in the world, there was no doubt that it had the raw materials for erecting a fission factory. Nor was there any question that the Soviets had enough steel and concrete to build necessary installations. But the USSR's key industries for manufacturing atomic equipment are only one-fifth the size of those in the United States. When we look into industries—chemical, precision machinery, electronics, and metallurgy—we see why the West's experts erred.

Stalin's chemical industry, though small by US standards, was the third largest in the world even before the war. It includes a synthetic rubber industry second only to that of the United States—this is especially important since the problem of putting up an artificial rubber factory is very similar to that of putting up an atomic plant.

Despite the comparatively small size of the Soviet precision tools and machinery industry, it meets all but 3 percent of Russia's needs for watches and other delicate instruments. Moreover, it has almost doubled its production so far in the postwar Five-Year Plan of 1946-1950. The Soviet electronics industry presents the same picture, and from 1946 forward has been increasing its output of intricate electrical equipment from two to seven times.

As for the Russian metallurgical industry, it is not only the world's second largest producer of steel and gold, third in aluminum and zinc, and fourth in lead (all used in atomic factories), but even before the war it was the biggest manufacturer of alloy steel on earth. Mastery of difficult alloy combinations is a major secret in building atomic piles.

German atomic scientists were not far advanced in nuclear research at the end of World War II. Their contributions to Russian advances in this sphere were not too great a help. But there is no doubt that East German chemical, mechanical, electronics and metallurgical factories rendered genuine assistance to the USSR's own Manhattan District Project.

Even so, Stalin might have waited until 1952 for his first A-bomb if he had sought to follow the American example and build four large atomic plants simultaneously, each using a different method—gaseous diffusion, electro-magnetic, thermal, and transmutation—to separate the explosive metal from raw uranium. Non-Russian experts guessed that he would do just that. But the USSR did not need to build all four types, because it knew from American experience that any of them would work. T US tried four ways out of fear th one or more might fail. Russia w able to select the simplest type—t Hanford plutonium plant, and ma a copy.

Eventually, of course, the Russia will wish to equal US bomb outp capacity. But there was nothing prevent them from swiftly rushi through one unit of the Hanford ty in order to get a few bombs in hurry. That is precisely what th did. This is typical Politburo p chology: produce every type weapon in the USSR even if many can be made. In the ea 1920's, long before the intensive dustrialization of the Five-Year Pla and even prior to Stalin's assumpti of power, backward Soviet Rus created its own aircraft indust Production was so small and cru that only scout planes came out the factories. No bombers, fighters large passenger or freight pla could be made until years later. I at least, the Russians were learni how to manufacture airplanes.

Finally, foreign atomic expe were sure that the USSR would la the enormous quantity of elect power needed to operate a nucl fission factory, since the Americ Hanford plant alone uses about h a million kilowatts a day. In the pa the Dnieper Dam had the only pow station of that size in the Sov Union. It was too close to the fr tiers. However, under the postw Five-Year Plan of 1946-1950 USSR is constructing three gi dams and hydro-electric stations: south of Tashkent at Farkhad southeast Central Asia, next door the uranium deposits of the Ferga valley; 2) the west Urals project the upper Kama River, near the lo carnotite reserves; 3) a power s tion larger than the Dnieper D is rising on the Angara River an the forests and mountains of e central Siberia. It is almost cert that the Atomgrad, which was sponsible for the September 19 Soviet explosion, is at one of th three remote and safe locations, from the beaten track even wit the land of the Soviets.

PROFESSOR PETER KAPITSA

Atomic Action Plan For The United Nations

A 10-Point Program to End the Atomic Deadlock is here set forth by an outstanding UN Correspondent on the basis of his discussions with the world's leading statesmen and their scientific advisers

By PETER KIHSS

THE disagreement between the East and West over the control of the atom as a lethal weapon has been overshadowing other, less dramatic but no less vital aspects of the atomic energy problem. One is too apt to forget that the UN Atomic Energy Commission was originally set up "for extending between nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends."

The day of political agreement on thorough-going UN control of the dangerous side of atomic energy still looks a long way off, but this, in itself, is not an utter tragedy. The Charter of the UN already outlaws war—not just war with atomic weapons—but all war.

For every pound of fissionable materials burned up in an atomic pile, there is produced about a pound of radioactive materials — atoms with radiation-giving healing and tracer powers, in quantities science has never had before. And while the UN should hold political lines as best it can, there is no reason why it shouldn't go ahead with peace building efforts along other paths—including those in the atomic fields. This would be practical even today when the Soviet Union declines to let most would-be visitors into its borders and prefers to keep its scientists and intellectuals generally at home.

The least the UN can do is to promote the use of man-made treasures to prove the processes of life—perhaps, for example, for some day unlocking the mystery of photosynthesis, by which plants take the sun's energy and make it useable on earth —and for healing the sick.

There is now in operation, thanks to the present enlightened policies of the United States, a cooperative venture in such radioactive materials.

Atomic Action Plan

There is no reason why the UN could not take a hand in it, with such materials abounding also from the atomic piles of Canada, Great Britain, France and presumably the Soviet Union, as well as the planned reactors of Norway, Sweden, India and New Zealand. And, if the program were to come under UN auspices, the work with peaceful radioisotopes—excluding those adaptable for military weapons—might well offer one more habit of cooperation in a world which has to learn more such habits.

At a time when news of Soviet achievement of an atomic explosion has caused the UN to look anxiously into the atomic problem, thirty nations have agreed to sharing the use of radioactive materials for research and medical treatment in the last two years. Under auspices of the United States, the program has called for six-month reports to the United States Atomic Energy Commission on results of such use, and for opening up of laboratories abroad

So, for instance, with American radioactive sulphur atoms, Sir Alexander Fleming, the British scientist who discovered penicillin, has tagged his wonder drug in order to trace how it works its cures. So, in Switzerland, another investigation has found out how to use radioactive cobalt, a cheap substitute for radium, against cancers hard to treat by needles or outside radiation—the method inserts a small balloon attached to a tube, and then fills it with the hot atoms in liquid form. In Nigeria, mosquitoes have been reared in radiostrontium baths, and their life habits have been followed to learn how they spread, so that some day epidemiologists may trace back sources of yellow fever infection.

Once upon a time, Soviet Ukrainian Deputy Health Minister N. Baran complained that smaller countries weren't able to obtain radioisotopes, and contended the World Health Organization ought to be doing something about it. In fact, the Eastern European nations—except for Finland—have never made any bid to join the sharing scheme worked out by the United States. Also, in fact, the benefits to peaceful development from Eastern European brainwork in this field are not being obtained by the world community.

The first purpose of the UN's initial atomic resolution, a joint proposal of the Big 5 Powers and Canada, might well be carried out by empowering the UN to act as a clearing house for surplus radioisotopes—of the non-dangerous variety—from American, Canadian, British, French, Soviet and other atomic projects.

The UN might receive applications, train workers in the use of such materials (as the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies has trained sixteen Belgian, Canadian, Danish, Finnish, Indian, Dutch, New Zealand, Norwegian, Spanish and British scientists, in addition to Americans), decide priorities, and, above all, insure exchange of results.

There is, of course, the other side of the atomic picture—the large-scale projects which raise the peril far more than the promises, of atomic energy. Whether atomic development is Western or Eastern, the problems on this side remain the same. They are not too complicated. Cutting through the propaganda and the recriminations that have beclouded the issues in UN debate, these are the needs that must be understood and then resolved:

1. *Should there be any international atomic control?* In view of the destruction wrought at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the potentials of radioactivity displayed at Bikini and the very war-breeding, suspicion-rearing nature of any such mass destruction weapon, there should be no opposition to this aim. In international cooperation, the atom can fill more of its promises for an abundant life than in national seclusion.

2. *In that case, what ought to be controlled?* It might be that all atomic development should be forbidden, uranium and thorium mines sealed, and no use allowed for these elements from which fissionable materials are derived. Or, there might be just enough use allowed to run research piles to produce radioactive tracers for present medical treatment and scientific investigations, and to open up future vistas of atomic energy. But Americans and Russians alike have been dwelling on the hope for large-scale development, inclu

ing eventual atomic power for at least power-poor areas of the world, thus involving dangerous amounts of fissionable materials. The UN majority has favored keeping down output to amounts actually required for known beneficial uses.

3. *Can atomic development be controlled?* Any atomic control rests on one fact. So far as science has now gone, atomic energy can be derived only from the chain reaction of uranium and thorium fission. So keeping track of uranium and thorium anywhere is the key. Major reserves are relatively few, although low-grade deposits are widely scattered. Uranium has come commercially in the past chiefly from Canada, the Belgian Congo, Czechoslovakia, Saxony, the United States and Soviet Turkestan; thorium from Travencore, Brazil, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia.

4. *Who then should be allowed to use uranium and thorium, and to operate the plants and piles producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities?* On this question, the UN Atomic Energy Commission has had a fundamental division. The Soviet Union has favored letting every nation run its own plants. The United States and the majority have insisted that only international operation of such plants can provide adequate safety.

5. *What are the dangers involved in operation of large atomic plants?* The risk here is that fissionable materials may be diverted or embezzled—enough over a period of time to provide for atomic weapons at the command of one nation or group, when other trustful nations would have no such weapons available. Or, the plants might actually be seized by a country deciding to go to war.

6. *How could diversion of materials or seizure of plants be avoided?* On this point, the majority holds that international operation and continuous watch by men of many nationalities would be the best guarantee—or at least warning. The Russians, proclaiming the gospel of national sovereignty, have been willing to allow only occasional visits of international inspectors to atomic activities. How, the majority has asked, could an occasional inspector know how much ore has actually been extracted from a mine? How could he tell the rate a pile had been running in the time since his last visit? Up to now, the Russians have called such technical questions hypothetical. They wouldn't accept the majority's claims that these problems were technically insoluble for an occasional visitor. Now the Russians can no longer argue that they don't know the technical problems. Logically, they should offer technical answers of their own.

7. *Should everything be controlled at once?* There might be, as Russia demands immediate outlawing and destruction of atomic weapons, and simultaneous setting up of control—whatever its scope—over all atomic activities from mines to production plants. But the majority has favored a step-by-step transition, pointing out it would be easy to destroy weapons in days or weeks, while it might take months or years to prove whether everybody had really carried out his pledges. The majority, however, has never actually laid out the stages by which it would proceed to full control. It has been conjectured that the first stage would be to check up on the world's raw materials resources, next take control of mining, then proceed on toward management of major plants, and somewhere late in the transition dispose of atomic weapons. In fact, the majority has never yet explained how atomic weapons would be disposed of—whether their casings and instrumentation would be destroyed, conserving the valuable stuffs in them, or whether the weapons would be turned over to a UN police force.

8. *How can these problems be settled?* One way tried was to debate them, scientifically and politically, in the Atomic Energy Commission, composed of the Security Council nations and Canada, reporting to the Council and the 59-nation General Assembly. This wound up with forty-six nations in all backing the majority plan, and only the six Slav nations favoring the Soviet views. Now the problem has been put into the hands of the Big 5—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, China—plus Canada, to confer behind closed doors. Perhaps it might be interesting to summon scientists before the UN and put the technological questions to them—unanswered heretofore by Soviet diplomats—to get their ideas. And perhaps it might be useful, too, to work out still more phases of the majority plan, such as the stages and production quota issues, and examine them in treaty form.

9. *Are there any points of agreement at all?* There are agreements—in principle—that (1) national atomic weapons should be outlawed, (2) ultimate control depends on the control of uranium and thorium, (3) a UN control agency should be set up by special pact, (4) it should have its own research functions, and promote exchange of scientific information, (5) it should get information on raw materials, (6) plants should be strategically distributed, (7) production should be limited by treaty quotas, (8) inspection should be by international personnel, limited to prevent arbitrary action, (9) day-to-day activities of the international agency should be carried on by majority rule, without veto, (10) the treaty should specify violations and establish punishments.

10. *How long can we go on the way we're going now?* There are no time limits for agreement or disagreement. The world situation, as it always has been, finds nations depending heavily on their own power or alliances for security, with some quest for international cooperation through the UN. Before this, there have been devastating weapons, too—bombers, poison gas, biological germs—although the atomic weapon has outstripped all others yet employed. But it is a sad truth that the way we're going has always meant international suspicions, frictions, periodic outbursts of war.

The A Bomb is Only One of the Many Revolutionary Discoveries Which Play Havoc with Man's Craving for Security In an Age of Revolutionary Changes

The Bomb And The Human Psyche

By FRANZ ALEXANDER, M.D.

Director, Institute of Psychoanalysis, Chicago; Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, College of Medicine, University of Illinois.

WHAT effect will the USSR's possession of the atom bomb have upon the psychology of the world's peoples? How will it influence their outlook on life, their mental balance or lack of it? What will it do to the psychic structure of modern man who may not be obsolete but who is already insecure?

The first obvious answer would seem to be that since this new development brings closer the chances of actual atomic warfare, it will intensify that widespread emotional insecurity which is the hallmark and hair-shirt of our chaotic age. But this expansion of insecurity is not likely to occur. For during the past 35 years people have been increasingly exposed to life as permanent insecurity. They have been moving from emergency to crisis to calamity as a result of war and preparation for war, of political convulsions, of economic shifts from depression to devaluation. Hence the threat of sudden extinction by means of atomic explosions that would turn the whole world into a Hiroshima added very little to the already disturbed state of mind plaguing man today. Indeed, to some people swift and sudden extinction may appear to be preferred to everlasting suspense in which doom is the invisible companion of our days. To many, a painless end may be more desirable than endless pain.

Seen in historical perspective, the shot that killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, started a new chapter of world history. An era marked by stability and certitude was replaced by an era of cataclysmic world wars. As in an earthquake the cultural crust of the globe began to crack—tremors and dislocations

set in on a monumental stage. Within 35 years, old empires declined and new ones arose. Everyone, experts in politics, history and the social sciences, as well as the man on the street, knows well that the quake is not yet over and everyone senses signs and portents of other decisive events.

In every new period of history it is not only social conditions which change. The emotional responses of people also change. The period which ended with the first World War was rightly called by one of its most sensitive representatives, Stefan Zweig, *The Golden Age of Security* where . . . "everything seemed based on permanence and the state itself was the chief guarantor of this stability. . . . Our currency . . . circulated in bright gold pieces, an insurance of its immutability. Everyone knew how much he possessed or what he was entitled to, what was permitted and what was forbidden. He who had a fortune could accurately compute his annual interest. An official or an officer, for example, could confidently look up in the calendar the year when he would be advanced in grade or when he would be pensioned. Each family had its fixed budget. . . ."*

This world of long term planning, permanency and predictability has vanished so completely that from the psychological point of view our present age could aptly be called the era of insecurity. To those of us who reached maturity before World War I, this change is more tangible than to those who never enjoyed the security of the previous years.

THE practising psychoanalyst observes this striking change in the psychological material of his neurotic patients. During the Victorian period when Freud began to dissect the emotional life of his patients under the microscope of psychoanalytic technique, he was impressed by the fact that repressed and frustrated sexual strivings were the main factors in causing neuroses. In the patients of today, these strivings are matched by other powerful emotional needs—security and dependence. They manifest themselves on a large scale by an increased desire for strong centralized government, by lack of courage and self-reliance, by the decline of the adventurous spirit.

The emotional climate of literature also reflects the antithesis between the prewar mentality and that of the present. The poets of the Victorian era tried desperately to adorn the monotonous trivialities of their existence with an aesthetic halo. Especially they endowed the relationship of the sexes with a delicate and artificial aura of super-sensitive complications. But the highly subjective reflections of mood in the impressionistic paintings and love poems of the French *fin de siècle* literature appear meaningless today. Amidst the explosion of bombs and the upsurge of the masses struggling for existence they appear as futile and absurd as playing the piano while the house is on fire.

IN THE last three decades the basic realities of existence have rapidly replaced all this ephemeral aestheticism of the past. Our literature and art have become more robust; social issues have replaced the delicacies of eroticism and mood. Competition, the struggle for social prestige, the problems of minorities and racial discrimination are the dominant topics while the different variations of the eternal love triangles have lost much of their emotional appeal. We have become more serious but infinitely more insecure at the same time. The possession of a new lethal weapon, although incomparably more powerful than anything known before, can scarcely add anything to this insecurity.

What is disturbing us is not primarily a fear of death. It is a much more complex form of anxiety. It is a sense of instability, a fear of unpredictable change, bewilderment as to a future which cannot be planned in any intelligent, orderly fashion.

Undoubtedly the rapid advancement of technology, that results from progress in basic scientific knowledge, accounts for so swift a social change that man cannot catch up to it and adapt himself emotionally. It is not difficult to predict that technical advancement with all its social and economic changes has still great latent possibilities for increasing man's insecurity. The machine tool, originally invented to make life easier by saving energy in the struggle for existence, paradoxically is achieving the oposite result. The so-called industrial revolution of the 19th century was at the same time the source of extremes of wealth and poverty. Advancement in labor-saving devices is far from being exhausted; and all indications are that in the future more and more will be accomplished by the automatic performance of complex machines. Imaginative scientists predict—nay demonstrate already—the possibility of robots capable of the most com-

Modern man as seen by a modern artist. From Frederick Frank's "Altar Piece."

**The World of Yesterday,* by Stefan Zweig, Viking Press, 1943.

plex and intelligent performance.

The new science of cybernetics, by which much of the performances of the brain can be duplicated by machines, is in the offing. Its effect upon our present economy and our emotional outlook is almost beyond imagination but will certainly be more revolutionary than that of the atomic bomb. If uninterrupted, this development will eventually lead to a state of affairs in which human labor will be, to an unprecedented degree, replaced by inanimate machines duplicating the reasoning faculties of the human organism. Socially useful occupations of man will then be restricted to those areas in which machine performance is of no avail. Humanity will then—if it survives the present crisis of the atomic weapons—face a dilemma of the greatest magnitude: the problem of constructive use of leisure. Before man can adjust himself and his social structure to this advanced state of machine civilization, the problems of unemployment will assume proportions unknown in the past.

This tragic mask, "Agnus Dei," is the artist's image of today's terrified, lost man.

All this adds up to the paradoxical fact that science, originally developed for making life easier for man, is far from having exhausted its capacity to increase man's insecurity. It requires from man changes in his social organization and emotional outlook which are beyond his adaptability. The invention of the atomic weapon is only one example of this basic phenomenon. Theoretically, the mastery of the almost inexhaustible source of atomic energy should give man a greater feeling of security and enable him to lessen the struggle for existence, make him independent of exhaustible raw materials, reduce his need to subjugate and exploit others. His first reaction, however, is to utilize this new source of power for destruction. With his greater ability to exploit nature he still retains his previous propensity to exploit his fellow man. He commands, in the form of machines, the most obedient and cheapest slaves and yet he still craves to enslave others.

We come to the conclusion that the possession of atomic weapons by two nations has no sigular importance concerning the emotional orientation of people. It is only one of the many examples by which technological advancement poses for man greater problems than those which it solves.

It is more difficult to predict the immediate practical consequences of this new state of affairs, particularly the question whether it brings war nearer. This the historian can better answer than the student of human psychology. According to the teachings of history, there are two constellations in which prolonged peace may prevail. The one is the absolute military superiority of one nation which makes war for all others completely hopeless. This is the pattern of the Roman peace. The hope, however, that after a Pax Romana and Pax Britannica, a period of Pax Americana may follow has certainly been reduced by the Russian ownership of the bomb. The other condition under which prolonged peace may prevail is a balance of power which makes war, if not hopeless, quite hazardous and in any case, extremely costly for all participants. From the point of view of human psychology this second type of peace is less secure than that based on the absolute superiority of one world power. History, however, never repeats itself completely. The atomic weapons introduced a situation which has never before prevailed to the same extent: warfare has changed from a purely military operation between two armies to an all-pervading destruction of centers of civilization.

The psychological implications of this change are not difficult to reconstruct. Originally war consisted of a kind of duel, primarily of the leaders, and secondarily of their henchmen. Gradually, with the introduction of mass armies, the leaders became more and more the planners and the strategists of warfare while the actual fighting became the lot of the common soldiers. Moreover, the function of declaring and fighting war was strictly divided between the soldiery and the political leaders. In the last war the destruction of the fighting armies still remained a main objective but at the same time war was brought home into the hinterland of the warring countries. In atomic warfare, according to predictions of military experts, this condition will be even more accentuated. Because greater and greater portions of the population will be affected by future warfare, there is little doubt that disinclination to war will spread among the population. In the past this unpopularity of war has never proved sufficiently strong to prevent war.

More important, however, is the fact that the division between preparing and declaring war, on the one hand, and fighting it personally on the other hand will be eliminated. Then the instinct of self-preservation may assert itself as an invincible incentive to end war for the first time in the history of the human race.

Beyond Capitalism and Communism: Supra-National Patriotism

A Guide For Living In The Atomic Age

For more than half a century, the thinking of Bertrand Arthur William, third Earl Russell, has been as bold and original in mathematics as in the field of social science. The range of his contributions to the making of the modern mind includes not only definitive studies on Leibnitz, on the foundations of geometry and similarly esoteric subjects, but also provocative inquiries into the conquest of happiness and the connection between marriage and morals.

A passionate non-conformist throughout his career, he was sentenced during World War I to six months in jail for writing a pacifist article. Some 20 years later, New York City deprived him of the right to teach in its schools because he advocated a degree of sexual freedom that violated many traditional conventions. Today at 77, Lord Russell is generally recognized as one of the western world's most seminal minds.

By BERTRAND RUSSELL

WHAT is meant by "loyalty"? When is it a virtue, and when a vice?

"Loyalty" may be defined as willingness to make personal sacrifices for the good of a group of which one is a member. Men can and do feel loyalty to many different kinds of groups, of which family, nation, race, class, party, creed, are the most important. The first three are biological, the last three mental. Buddha, Christ and the Stoics taught that we ought to feel loyalty to all mankind, but so far their teaching has had little effect.

Is loyalty always a virtue? I should say emphatically No. It is common to think that all bad conduct springs from selfishness, and to infer that any conduct which has an unselfish motive must be good. But if by "good" we mean "likely to promote human welfare," then much unselfish conduct must count as "bad." Everything depends upon the cause to which sacrifice is made.

Broadly speaking, loyalty is undesirable when the group concerned has harmful purposes. A pirate may risk his life to save that of his captain, when it would be a good thing if his captain were killed. Similarly, a soldier may die for his country in an unjust war. The world would now be better than it is if, in the two world wars, Germans had been destitute of loyalty—at least so most people who are not German think. What can be said generally is that no group is likely to achieve any collective purpose, whether good or bad, unless most of the members of the group are loyal to it. It may also be said that loyalty in a good cause is not likely to exist unless blind unquestioning loyalty has become a habit. On this ground many people

Guide for Living *continued*

value loyalty regardless of its object. But I think that such people have failed to realize how much of what is worst and most dangerous in the existing world situation is due to this very practice of unquestioning loyalty, particularly loyalty to the national State.

Today it has become of the utmost importance to generate, if possible, new loyalties which transcend the boundaries of national states. But can loyalty be extended from the national State to a supra-national group of states? The problem is difficult both politically and psychologically. Let us consider first what are the most usual or most potent causes of loyalty itself.

It is clear that loyalty has an instinctive basis; it exists in savage tribes. It seems to be natural to human beings to view members of their own herd with feelings that are friendly in the absence of specific causes of hostility, and to view everyone else with feelings that are hostile in the absence of special reasons for friendliness. Among savages the herd is small, and every member of it is known to every other; the basis of friendliness in this case is familiarity. Although, in a large modern nation, this basis is not so directly present, it still supplies a background. Members of the same nation, on the average, have more in common than members of different nations—language, ways of behaving, habits in eating and drinking, and so on. But, above all, they have the same enemies. Foreigners may always be a source of danger, and if this happens compatriots are likely to find themselves on the same side. Connected with the sense of danger is love of home. A hen will risk death by crossing a road in front of a car, because she feels safer at home. Human beings also feel safer at home and emotionally they feel as if all compatriots had the same home. This makes all compatriots lovable in times of danger.

In addition to the instinctive grounds of loyalty, there are others that have a more or less rational basis. The chief of these are common interests and common beliefs. Among groups generated by the former are pirate crews, invading armies, and companies for the development of backward areas; among the latter, political parties and religious sects. But loyalties of this sort are not very secure under stress, unless they ha a backing in instinctive loyalties a very obvious and compelling app to self-interest. It is this that cau the difficulty in generating a sup national loyalty. The instinctive p tends to remain purely national, a the remainder, so long as it deper upon reason and argument, is lik to break down just when it is m needed.

The problem of supra-national l alty differs according to whether new unit is world-wide or is only group which has, or may have, ternal enemies. The Western Uni or the countries in the Atlantic Pa may acquire unity and insp loyalty, from fear of Russia or Communism. Fear of external e mies has always been the most p erful source of social cohesion. T can be invoked, given adequ propaganda, whenever there is obvious external common dang But it is not easy to picture in t way a loyalty to the whole hum race or to a world State.

Communists have to a great ext succeeded in creating among th non-Russian adherents a loya which is supra-national. They h done this in four ways: by a d matic common creed; by inspir hate and fear towards non-Com

Greatness knows no nationality. These men belong to humanity.

DA VINCI

BACH



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

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

TOLSTOY

GANDHI

nists; by completely rewriting history; and by a monopoly of all means of propaganda (including education and the press) wherever they have acquired power. These methods cannot produce a world-wide unity except by the complete victory of Communism. The methods are, in the main, such as non-Communists cannot adopt without being untrue to their principles. We must, therefore, look for other ways of producing a supra-national loyalty.

I THINK it should not be very difficult, in the course of fifty years or so, to generate a very reliable loyalty to a group such as the Western Union, or even to the whole of Western Europe and English-speaking North America. There is a considerable degree of cultural unity, produced first by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, and strengthened in our own time by science and scientific technique. There is (rightly or wrongly) a common apprehension of danger from the East. These causes have already given rise to a vigorous movement towards political union, and they should, before long, produce a corresponding degree of economic cooperation.

If a group of Western Powers are genuinely anxious to create a supra-national sense of solidarity among the nations composing the group, there are certain things that they must do. First, they must rewrite the textbooks of history used in schools, which should become the same in all countries concerned. The new textbooks should lay stress on whatever cultural unity exists, and should minimize cultural differences. They should carefully abstain from glorification of any one member nation at the expense of any other. They should make past wars between member nations appear as foolish civil wars. And they should suggest that the nations composing the group can do great things for mankind in the future, provided they remain friends and not enemies.

Next, they should have a common flag and a common supra-national anthem. The Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack must no longer obtrude themselves on the conscious-

Russell on Life, Love and Science

From "Marriage and Morals"

"In America . . . law and custom alike are based upon the dreams of spinsters."

"To fear love is to fear life, and those who fear life are three parts dead."

From "The Conquest of Happiness"

"Envy is the basis of democracy."

"A happy life must be to a great extent a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live."

"To be able to fill leisure intelligently is the last product of civilization."

"Many people when they fall in love look for a little haven of refuge from the world, where they can be sure of being admired when they are not admirable, and praised when they are not praiseworthy."

From "Sceptical Essays"

"William James used to preach the 'will to believe.' For my part, I should wish to preach the 'will to doubt' . . . What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out, which is the exact opposite."

"The infliction of cruelty with a good conscience is a delight to moralists. That is why they invented Hell."

"Every man, wherever he goes, is encompassed by a cloud of comforting convictions, which move with him like flies on a summer day."

"We are faced with the paradoxical fact that education has become one of the chief obstacles to intelligence and freedom of thought."

"Machines are worshipped because they are beautiful, and valued because they confer power; they are hated because they are hideous, and loathed because they impose slavery."

From "The Study of Mathematics"

"Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible."

"Mathematics possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show."

"Mathematics takes us into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world, must conform."

From "Principles of Social Reconstruction"

"It is preoccupation with possession, more than anything else, that prevents men from living freely and nobly."

A Guide for Living *continued*

ness of children, and it must not be for "God Save the King" that we all stand up. But these powerful methods of emotional stimulation must not be discarded; they must merely be transferred to new symbols. I am sure the reader will feel a vehement resistance to this suggestion. I feel it myself. But the strength of our unreflecting resistance is the best proof of the necessity of the change that I am advocating.

THERE is another measure which may be desirable with a view to stimulating a feeling of unity, but which has its dangers. The unity of a nation is symbolized by a King or President, and a supra-national union, if it is to make an equally strong appeal, must also be symbolized by a person. In modern times such a person cannot be a King or Emperor, but must be an elected President. There are, however, two dangers. One is that the President might become a Führer; the other is that there might be jealousies and contests between the nations as to which of them the President should come from. To obviate the first of these dangers, I should give to the President only such functions as belong to our King. To obviate the second, I should decree that he must come from a country with a small population. Given these two conditions, I think the President should be chosen for life, prayed for in church, and saluted with a salute of more than twenty-one guns.

Loyalty to a group of Powers which is not world-wide can be much facilitated by methods which retard the advance to world unity. Fear of hostile groups is the main cause of such supra-national unity as now exists or is within the sphere of practical politics. To emphasize such fear in education and in political propaganda is one of the easiest ways of stimulating the sentiment of unity. Another is to preach the superiority of our own group of nations; for instance, by calling it the Christian group, and dwelling on the merits of Christianity as compared to other religions. Such methods of producing unity in a group, though they may be necessary for practical reasons, are to be deprecated in the long run, except is so far as they are a liberation from the tyranny of a narrow nationalism. Combinations of groups of nations are, I think, very necessary for a number of urgent reasons, but only a world-wide unity affords any real solution of the appalling problems with which civilization is faced. And for the present the prospect of world-wide unity is very dim.

TO GENERATE the kind of sentiment which (one hopes) will ultimately make world unity a real thing, first leaders and then populations must undergo a long process of re-education. We must learn to think and feel about mankind collectively. We must give our attention to the things that have been achieved by the human race: tools, fire, language, agriculture, art, science, industry, etc. We must emphasize both biological evolution and the diffusion of culture. The history that we teach to the young must show how, over and over again, civilizations have climbed to a certain height, and then decayed by ossification or been destroyed by war. In economics, instead of laying stress on competition, we must show how wealth has resulted from cooperation in larger and larger units The aim should be to create a fee ing for man as man, and a realiz tion of the ways by which he ma more and more develop the meri by which he is distinguished from th rest of the known universe. The r sult should be that, when any polic is proposed, our first spontaneou reaction is to consider how it wi affect mankind, not how it will affe this or that group.

ALTHOUGH our main emphasi should be on the hope of positiv achievement, there is still a place fo the rational realization of danger Do you wish the human race to b exterminated by atom bombs? Ar you content that we should continu to suffer from plagues and pestilence which a concerted effort could wip out? Are you willing to look o passively while the population in creases to a point at which an ad quate food supply becomes impossi ble? Of such world-wide human prob lems there are many. They canno be tackled at present, because no on effectively cares for mankind as whole. If governments so desire the young could be educated in way which would make them a vividly aware of such problems a they now are of those affecting th safety of their own nation.

Before this can happen, howeve we have a long way to go. It is nin teen hundred years since Christ said "Thou shalt love thy neighbor a thyself." I wonder how many mo years it will be before people begi to think that this was sound advic



Civilization In Danger

By VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

Nobel Peace Prize, 1937

The world's Elder Statesman, a Conservative member of the House of Lords and ardent internationalist, in a dramatic appeal to the General Assembly and the Atlantic Powers suggests some radical changes in international policy:

Find way out of the veto deadlock. . . . Open the Atlantic Pact to all, even Soviet Russia. . . . Find a non-diplomatic world personality of the Harry Hopkins type to negotiate at once with the Kremlin.

THE Assembly of the United Nations is now in session. They have a large and varied Agenda. May I venture to appeal to them most urgently not to allow any other subject for consideration to interfere with the vital problem of international security. The situation is becoming so familiar that it is in danger of being treated with contempt. May I then venture to remind my readers of certain admitted facts.

I believe that now an airplane can fly from New York to Paris in some thirteen hours and there is every prospect of that period being materially reduced in the near future. That is to say that in something like that space of time after the outbreak of hostilities a European enemy of the United States could drop bombs on any of the American cities. That, of course, would be equally true of any English city, except that the delay would be very much less. We know the extent of destruction wrought by a single atomic bomb at Hiroshima. It is therefore the simple truth that any belligerent Power which had the use of atomic bombs could wipe out any city belonging to its enemies within twenty-four hours of the outbreak of war. It is not easy to say what that would mean in terms of loss of human life. But it would seem probable that the loss would run into hundreds of thousands. I know it is objected that most countries have not got atomic bombs. But who can tell if that is true now and, if so, how long it will remain true? Moreover, there are those who say that there are inventions of other forms of air attack so terrible that even atomic bombs will seem merciful.

However that may be, one thing is certain: that any future war will be far more destructive and far more cruel than anything of the kind that has hitherto taken place. It may be doubtful what would be the result of such a catastrophe on the highly complicated civilization under which we live. We are still reeling from the effects of the last war in Europe and Asia and, but for the direct and indirect assistance from America, the consequences might have been far worse. It seems at least possible that a war under the new conditions which must be expected would bring us very near chaos, with all the vast mass of human misery which such a result would involve.

Nor can we reasonably believe that any international

measures to mitigate the horrors of future war would succeed. The urgency of the dangers to be feared will make acceptable any counter measures, however horrible. Cruelty begets cruelty, slaughter begets slaughter. No one would have believed beforehand that the cultured peoples of Europe would have been guilty of the bestial crimes they committed in the last war. Nor would they have done so except for the terrors with which they were menaced. When a nation is threatened with wholesale extermination, there is no limit to what it will do in self-defense.

There is nothing new in what I have said. It has been merely a statement of the international facts universally acknowledged and admitted. We are living under conditions in which a future war would not only cause the massacre of thousands—if not millions—of human beings, but would be in all probability the first step towards a reversion to barbarism. And this would be true not only of the defeated nations but almost equally of the victors. It is not conquest that we have to fear but rather the new scientific warfare.

The Most Urgent Duty

What, then, can be done? Some say that we are suffering from a spiritual disease and only spiritual regeneration can save us. It may be so. But even then there can be no excuse for not taking all measures open to us for the maintenance of peace and security. That is what the overwhelming mass of our fellow-men desire. It was to attain that object that the "international organization to be known as the United Nations" was established by the Charter. There can be no more urgent duty of the Assembly than to inquire whether we have that security and if not, what more is necessary.

The purpose of the United Nations is clearly stated in the first Article of the Charter. It is "to maintain international peace and security" and to suppress "acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace." The international machinery to carry out this duty chiefly consists of the Assembly and the Security Council. But it is on the latter body that is conferred, by Article 24, the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and it is given power to use any methods of persuasion or negotiation for that purpose. If these methods are insufficient, then the Security Council is authorized to use whatever armed force may be nesessary, by Article 43, and "all members of the United Nations . . . undertake to make available to the Security Council" whatever force may be required and to take whatever action may be determined on by the Security Council. There follow subsidiary provisions, such as the creation of an international General Staff and international armed forces.

The essence of this part of the scheme is to make the Security Council responsible for the maintenance of peace and to give it power to compel all the United Nations to use their national forces for that purpose. I other words, the Security Council is given the right t insist on any of the United Nations going to war wit a country deemed by the Council to be an aggressor, eve though that opinion be not accepted by the governmen of the nation required to make war. When that becam clear at the San Francisco Conference, certain importan States including, I believe, both Russia and the Unite States, objected that their peoples would never agree t suffer the fearful consequences of modern war agains the judgment of their own governments at the biddin of an international body. Indeed, it is doubtful whethe any important country would have accepted such a obligation but for the fact that the victorious powers i the World War had acquired an exceptional degree o confidence in one another. The result was the provisio in the Charter that no important decision of the Securit Council should be valid without the unanimous conse of the Five Chief Powers, who were permanent member of it. That is the notorious power of veto.

Possibly such an arrangement might have worked the permanent powers had been ready to make compro mises with one another. But it very soon became clea that Russia was not prepared to do anything of the kin She insisted on vetoing any proposal with which she wa not in full agreement. It also must be admitted that wha may be called the exercise of the peace powers of th United Nations is the exclusive right of the Securit Council, so that unless the Council is ready to act, n direct enforcement of peace under the Charter can b carried out. Thus the United Nations as an instrume for directly maintaining peace has failed, admirabl though its activities have been in other respects.

Strength and Weaknesses of the Atlantic Pac

It was in order to meet this difficulty that the Atlant Pact was made. That is a step in the right direction. makes it the duty of the signatories to prevent any a gressive armed attack in certain regions more or le connected with the Atlantic Ocean. There are apparent to be a number of local sub-committees to arrange f action in different parts of the whole area. And there to be a central committee, consisting of the United State the United Kingdom and France, which is to have general but undefined supervision of the activities of t sub-committees. But there is to be no power in the ce tral or the local sub-committees to order any of t signatories to go to war with the alleged aggressor. that, the precedent of the League of Nations Covenant followed in preference to that of the Charter. In oth words, it enables the signatories to cooperate against a aggressor but it does not create machinery to comp them to do so. That is, in my judgment, quite right. the present state of international relations it is impo sible for any international authority to give orders any of the States which comprise it insisting that th should go to war with some other State, even against t judgment of their own government. It is equally wro

to try to prevent States from taking action against an aggressor without the approval of a central authority. It was in the desire to exercise such a prevention that the so-called veto was agreed to. To attempt to erect an international authority with a right to command or forbid its component States to take or refrain from action against an aggressor is to go beyond international public opinion of the present day.

Subject to that limitation, the peace-keeping machinery should be as extensive as possible. It is an error to confine its operation to particular sections of the world, as is done in the Atlantic Pact. What is to happen if there should be an international explosion in China or India, as might easily occur? Even in the case of Yugoslavia there would be great difficulties. The maxim that "Peace is Indivisible" is surely sound. In modern conditions, wherever a war begins it may easily spread over the whole world.

Similarly I doubt if it is wise to confine the *casus foederis* to "armed attack." Aggression may take other equally dangerous forms. In the case of hostility by a large country against a smaller one, hope of saving the latter might well depend on action being taken before any actual armed attack had been launched. Moreover, as I have before contended, the world danger is war and not only defeat. I therefore think that international protection should be extended to any danger threatening a State's integrity or independence.

There is one other point that must not be overlooked. By the Atlantic Pact no one is to be admitted as an additional signatory without the unanimous consent of all existing members. That is the creation of a new veto and I think an unfortunate one. Far better to let any State join who wishes to do so and is ready to accept the necessary principles. Some have seen in this provision a precaution against Russia. But surely there is scarcely anything more desirable for peace than full Russian cooperation. Just consider the extent of her territory, the number of her population, her immense mineral and agricultural resources. If all these are left out of the peace scheme, how can we have that overwhelming preponderance for peace which is our best hope not of victory but rather of over-awing a possible aggressor. Is the world to be divided into pro-Russians and anti-Russians, with Chinese or other Asiatics thrown in on the Russian side? It may come to that, but the tale of human suffering involved would be terrific.



THE AUTHOR: LORD ROBERT CECIL

Wanted—A Negotiator With Russia

I do not, indeed, believe in appeasing Russia. That is, if not immoral, at least utterly futile. But why refuse her aid if she is willing to help? Many of those who know the Kremlin best say that there is nothing to be done in that way. It may be so. But have we tried everything? This is not a job for a trained diplomatist, for he would not find a diplomatic atmosphere in Moscow. Still less would a regular politician be of any use, even if he belonged to the Left, for such men only excite Russian suspicion. What we need is a man of courage and imagination, preferably outside politics, who would understand the Russian point of view and believe in their desire for peace. With such a man, would there not be a chance of persuading the Russians that the best, if not the only, way to secure peace is to enable—but not compel—all peace-loving powers to combine against an aggressor? It would of course be well understood that if any State felt unable to take part in such action it would be entitled to stand aside.

That, at any rate, is what I should like to see done. It might involve some amendment of the Charter and that might be rejected. But if world opinion is convinced that some change in this direction is necessary, no technical difficulties will in the end prevent its acceptance.

The First Month of the Fourth Assembly

A Few Green Shoots Appear

THE Fourth General Assembly has labored in its field for more than a month. The signs of harvest are not unpromising. On Oct. 24, the member nations gathered in love feast to lay the cornerstone for the new UN skyscraper headquarters (with walls of blue transparent glass) on the East River waterfront. On the world front, the General Assembly's Economic Committee laid the historic cornerstone of East-West cooperation by unanimously approving the new Technical Assistance Program (See Page 45). Under the plan, countries advanced in technology will share their "know-how" with those less fortunate.

Grave political issues remained to be solved: the atomic stalemate, the implications of the Chinese Communist revolution, the Jerusalem controversy and others.

ATOM BOMB No amount of public or private conferring among nations has achieved agreement on atomic controls. Russian Vishinsky's call for a peace pact between the Big Five, with "unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and . . . rigid international control" was branded by the West as hypocrytical. France led the counter-move to amend the Russian resolution before the Security Council, to include the inspection and control features contained in the majority-approved plan of the Atomic Energy Commission. To Russia, who shies off of inspection on her territory, this amended version was inacceptable. The deadlock therefore remained, and there was scant hope that the General Assembly could break it, though the United States was ready to submit a new over-all plan for atomic energy control, disarmament and general peace settlement. Despite these and other proposals for making the world safe from atomic war (See Sir Benegal Narsing Rau, Page 48), it seems probable the whole atomic issue will go over to the Fifth Assembly next year—with a possible declaration now against use of the bomb except in meeting aggression.

ITALIAN COLONIES The puzzle over what to do about the former Italian colonies seems about to be answered. Libya's independence by 1952 is assured, with a UN Commissioner aiding her to set up a democratic government. Eritrea may be divided between Ethiopia and the Sudan, as favored by the US and the UK. Italian Somaliland will probably be placed under Italian trusteeship while it prepares for independence in ten years.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS The same special committee recommended asking the World Court to decide whether alleged violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania can be dealt with as failures of these nations to abide by the peace treaties—and whether their governments would have the obligation to join in UN consultations. The Court's answer would be expected for the Fifth General Assembly. Though the delay seemed unavoidable, it offered small comfort to Cardinal Mindszenty and others who are languishing in jail.

KOREA The threat of civil war in Korea, where the UN-recognized Republic is menaced by a Communist puppet regime in the north, got decisive treatment. Over Russian protests, the General Assembly's special political committee recommended continuing the Korean Commission and strengthening it by the addition of military observers to do "watchdog" duty against any interference.

JERUSALEM Lines were drawn for a sharp battle in the General Assembly over Jerusalem. Israel remained bitterly opposed to the UN Conciliation Commission's plan for placing the city under international control. But the stand of the US and Britain appeared to have stiffened against any move to let Israel take over the Jewish-populated portion of the city. On the bright side in Palestine, the Conciliation Commission's survey group, headed by Gordon R. Clapp, had finished its study of work projects and will report soon on a two-year plan to help provide for Arab refugees. The whole region is certain to get UN technical asistance.

BALKANS A General Assembly Conciliation Committee reported its failure to re-establish peaceful relations between Greece and her northern Communist neighbors. The Balkan situation remained grave, in spite of the cease-fire order of Greek guerrillas in Albanian camps. Conflict between the USSR and Tito was heightened by Yugoslavia's action in seeking a Security Council seat. There was danger that as the Greek war ended, guerrilla warfare against Tito might begin.

UN CENTENARY Mr. Wallace Harrison, UN Headquarters architect, stood in the middle of East 42nd Street pointing up at the mounting skyscraper. Several important looking gentlemen followed his gesture and hung on his words. Said a bystander, watching them: "They must be Rockefeller's men. He leased the land to the UN for 99 years—but if the UN folds, he'll get the building and turn it into apartments. So he kinda keeps an eye on everything."

Said another bystander: "Gosh, if it folds, it won't be healthy to have an apartment around here!"



East and West Square Off for

The Great China Debate

Has Chinese Communist Mao Tze-tung a right to wear the democratic mantle of Sun Yat-sen, "father of the Chinese Republic?" Or is he the tool of Russian expansion in Asia? The Assembly is called upon to determine how genuine is the revolution, how real the interference.

By LAURA VITRAY

When China's delegate asked the General Assembly to hear without delay his country's charges against the Soviet Union, shrewd Dr. Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia commented: "The China debate will be the great ideological debate of our time, and should be put off as long as possible."

For once there was plenty of East-West agreement. The topic was not one on which any great power cared to go off half-cocked. UN judgments on China can have world-shaking consequences. No nation wished to come to the conference unprepared.

Boiled down, the Chinese Nationalist Government's accusation is that Russia, through aid to the Chinese Communists, is undermining China's freedom and threatening peace in the Far East. Chief delegate T. F. Tsiang has declared he will seek a "moral judgment" condemning Russia when the great debate gets under way in November. Such a judgment would by inference brand the recently proclaimed People's Republic of China a mere puppet regime, unworthy of recognition by the UN and its members.

The new regime has been forged in the sweep of spectacular conquests that have carried the Communists to control over two-thirds of China's vast territory and of its 450,000,000 people.

Without waiting for any red-hot polemics in the Assembly, the Soviet-bloc states, and also anti-Soviet communist Yugoslavia, have hastened to recognize the People's Republic. How it will fare with the Western nations depends first on the Assembly verdict —but likewise on such major considerations as: 1) trade with the Chinese government and trade within China, which Britain especially can ill afford to lose; 2) ability of the Communists to administer the machinery of government with assent of the people; 3) its willingness to assume China's

political and commercial treaty obligations.

Tragic Background

The elements of the great UN China debate can best be understood against a backdrop of Chinese turmoil and sufferings in our century—and through the lives of the three men who have sought to give their country leadership. The three are Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Tze-tung. The avowed purpose of each has been to lift the nation out of feudalism, unify it and set it on the path of progress which alone can rescue its people from starvation and despair.

It has been said with authority that only in China is the lot of men worse than it was in Europe 500 years ago. The average of life expectancy is still as low as 27 years, in contrast to the United States, where it is climbing toward 67. Of China's nearly half-a-billion population, four-fifths are peasants huddled in filthy, unsanitary villages, going out to till the minuscule plots of ground they very seldom own. The humble, illiterate peasant in the rice fields has been brutalized by toil, shackled by superstition, unaided by any modern device or scientific knowledge. It is hardly surprising that he has been unable to free himself from the tyranny of local landlords and regional warlords, who have wrested from him in "taxes" from 50 to 80 per cent of his meagre crop. The Chinese peasant has starved in a land so rich in natural resources that other nations eye it covetously, and have used everything from arms to opium in their effort to seize its wealth.

The Vision of Sun Yat-sen

China was still in the grip of the nefarious Manchu emperors when, a year after the Civil War ended in the United States, a peasant boy was born in the village of Choyhung, forty miles from Canton. He was called Sun Yat-sen. In his person the revolt and misery and anguished urge of China's millions were incarnated.

At fourteen, Sun Yat-sen ran away and shipped on a boat for Honolulu. A much older brother was already there and prospering. He paid for Sun's education in the local Church of England school. At eighteen this child of illiterates was graduated with honors. Already he was a Christian and an ardent revolutionary, dreaming of the Manchus' overthrow. Returning home, he came near to being beheaded for breaking an arm off the local plaster god. That prank banished him. He went to Hong Kong, where British friends helped him to study medicine. He became a competent surgeon. But the operation to which he was vowed was amputation of the Manchus, which liberals then thought would pave the way to social reform. Untiring in his revolutionary activities, quiet, scholarly Dr. Sun Yat-sen soon found himself a hunted man. Manchu henchmen pursued him across America and Europe, kidnapped him in London. He was saved, he himself declared, by the power of prayer.

While in New York's Chinatown, Sun read Lincoln's Gettysburg address. He was deeply stirred by the words "that government *of the people, by the people,* and *for the peopl* shall not perish from the earth." H must have traced those words to thei source. Transforming them in hi Chinese thinking, he fashioned hi three great Principles for the futur Republic of China. *Of* the Chines people became *Nationalism:* a sov ereign unified state from which fo eign territorial concessions must b ousted. *By* the Chinese people mean *Democracy*. The Chinese people mus be taught to read and write, and vote Power must rise from them to a gov ernment responsive to their will. *Fo* the Chinese people meant the peo ple's *Livelihood*. The peasant mus own the land. The government mus socialize basic industries and creat new ones, to enable the worker an his children to live.

Enter the Kuomintang

The fall of the Manchus came i 1911, but was not followed by the re public Sun Yat-sen had visioned China's mighty warlords divided th country amongst themselves. Thei armies preyed on the peasantry i bloody orgies of taxation, plun der, rape and murder. Against these horrors, by 1923, Sun had raised u a great new political instrument: th

"SMALL FRY." THE FUTURE OF MILLIONS IS AT STAKE IN TODAY'S CHINA

Kuomintang, with a nominal seat of government at Canton.

Sun accepted the aid and collaboration of the USSR, the Third International, and the Chinese Communist Party, but with the understanding that "the Communist order, or even the Soviet System cannot actually be introduced into China." Yet he sent the director of his Whampao Military Academy to Moscow for six months.

This young officer's name was Chiang Kai-shek. He had received his training in Japan. He distrusted foreigners. He was a patriot, a cold-blooded fighter, a man of terrific will and stubbornness. Authoritarianism grew in him with age. And Chiang grew to be the great "Generalissimo," super-warlord and dictator of China.

Balance Sheet of the Generalissimo

The era of Chiang Kai-shek has been elaborately portrayed by the United States in its White Paper. The official record leaves no doubt of the American government's sincere efforts to aid China in achieving sovereignty, democracy, and urgent social change. Yet US frustration is evident in the story of how financial, military and technical aid were paid off repeatedly by Chiang's broken promises. It was an era, of course, during which the United States was fighting a global war. Strategy in Asia demanded that China's resistance to Japan be maintained—and Chiang Kai-shek was the man who had to be dealt with.

Chiang had been acclaimed leader of the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925. The following year his revolutionary army, which still had Russian advisers, set out to unify China by destroying the power of the warlords in the north. After seizing Hankow and later Nanking, it swooped down on Shanghai in March 1927. There the workers, under Communist direction, had revolted and seized the city. They turned it over to the Generalissimo.

Chiang now ditched the Communists in a swift coup, and with an evident bid for the friendship of Shanghai's powerful commercial interests. Leaders of the revolt were executed, workers intimidated, as the Kuomintang purged its left wing with speed and brutality.

By June 1928 the Generalissimo had completed the official unification of China under a National Government, partly by crushing the warlords, partly by deals with them. He never foreswore loyalty to the Principles of Sun Yat-sen. But these underwent a sea-change in his authoritarian mind. He conceived himself as the "Trustee" of nationalism and sovereignty. He saw disorganized China more in need of a firm master than of a premature democracy. The establishment of a strong government did stimulate industrial and commercial activity. Middle-class liberals had been the backbone of the early Kuomintang. They wrote progressive legislation into the statute books, designed to furnish relief to the peasantry. It was never applied. Chiang made the local landlords his tax collectors. These men were old hands at putting the squeeze on someone other than themselves.

Meanwhile the National Government's stability was threatened by the existence of Chinese Communists in open rebellion. Large numbers of these were concentrated in the country south of Kiangsi. To exterminate them, the Generalissimo launched five major "bandit suppression campaigns" with hundreds of thousands of troops. In 1934-35, the Communists burst out of southern China and fled en masse to Shensi Province in the northwest. The column of men, women and children wound for 6,000 miles over the countryside, its ranks severely decimated by bullets, hunger and disease.

On the "long march" was a chubby, gregarious little fellow who had been in the first Chinese Soviet on the mountain of Chikanshan in South China. In the north, his shrewd intellect, combined with an easy sense of humor, won him overwhelming popularity and a dominant place in Communist Party leadership. His name was Mao Tze-tung.

Against Japan

While Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was directing his fury against the Communists, Japan in 1931, encouraged by division within China, embarked on a program of forcible expansion into Manchuria. Warnings by the League and by the United States failed to halt her land grab.

It was Mao Tze-tung who sounded the call for a "united front" against Japanese aggression. The slogan halted Chiang's armies, driving against their own nationals. In December 1936, Chiang flew to Sian to help map out a sixth "bandit suppression campaign." There he was kidnapped by one of his own generals, and Communist Party leaders were summoned to confer with him. Certainly Chiang hated the Japs. Out of the meeting came a war entente between the Kuomintang and Mao's guerrilla fighters.

The Reds and the Principles

The real victor in the strange parley at Sian was probably neither Chiang nor Mao—but the spirit of Sun Yat-sen. For the truce agreement stipulated that henceforth the Chinese Communists would cease to propagandize for a Chinese Soviet and for the "class struggle," and would accept Sun's Three Principles.

They proceeded to apply the Principles vigorously in their area of the north. The effect was an unprecedented gain in Party membership. Sun's *Nationalism* had significance for men embarking on a bitter struggle to oust a foreign enemy. Sun's *Democracy*, though it was imperfectly applied, resulted in a sharing of authority in the villages by Communist, Kuomintang and non-partisan followers. Sun's *People's Livelihood* replaced schemes for sovietization of the land in favor of distributing land to the peasant.

The experiment in applying Sun Yat-sen's Principles seems to have exerted profound influence on Mao Tze-tung's own thinking. In his book "The New Democracy," published in 1940 in Yenan, he expressed the view that China is not ready for socialism. He saw an era during which peasants and bourgeoisie, workers and middle-class liberals must cooperate to overthrow feudalism. He expressed faith in Russian alliance, but declared that Chinese needs, not foreign doctrines, must determine reforms.

The Great China Debate *continued*

World War II

Even before Pearl Harbor, the US had given assistance to China in resisting aggression. When her struggle became part of America's own war against Japan, aid was stepped up. Under American direction, Chinese officers were trained, Chinese weapons modernized. A credit "not to exceed $500,000,000" was approved by Congress for Chiang's government in February 1942.

American policy was directed toward recognition of China as a Great Power. The US took the initiative in concluding a treaty by which it relinquished extra-territorial rights. The "exclusion laws" against Chinese immigration were repealed. Subsequently China became one of the sponsoring powers of the UN Charter, with a permanent Security Council seat.

Yet by the summer of 1944, an alarming trend toward disintegration of China's resistance to Japan had become evident. Sun Yat-sen's son, Dr. Sun Fo, who was president of the Legislative Yuan, said frankly that the chief obstacle to prosecution of the war was immobilization of 300,000 of Chiang's best troops to watch the Communists. These tactics also immobilized large Communist forces.

How to break the wartime stalemate was a major US dilemma. Ambassador Gauss reported that: 1) Liberal elements in the Kuomintang had suffered a serious setback, and that "Kuomintang leadership was bankrupt;" 2) Russian intentions in China are aggressive; 3) Chinese Communists have a background of subservience to the USSR—but a new influence, *Nationalism,* is modifying their outlook; 4) in any struggle for control of the country the Communists would win, unless the US can help revitalize the Kuomintang by urging a coalition government.

To any such suggestions the Generalissimo turned a frozen ear.

Whatever were the Kremlin's real views on Mao Tze-tung, Molotov, during a meeting with Gen. Hurley in 1944, said the Chinese Communists were not Communists at all, that the Soviet Union was not supporting them, and would not support civil war in China. After Gen. Hurley became ambassador, he reported that the Generalissimo was ready for a settlement that recognized the Communists as a political party. Acting as mediator, Hurley brought a proposal from Mao for a coalition National Government, to "support the principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, by the people and for the people." Chiang refused coalition, and his counter-proposal was rejected by the Communists, who denounced "one-party government."

Meanwhile at Yalta in February 1945, Russia agreed to enter the war against Japan. In return she won a guarantee of the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia; safeguards for "the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union" in the commercial port of Dairen; and joint Soviet-Chinese control of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad. The Yalta provisions were written into the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945. Russia and China pledged mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It is this pact which the Nationalist Government now accuses Russia of breaking by aid to the Chinese Communists.

In Manchuria, after V-J day, China regained a rich agricultural area, and a vast industrial complex built by the Japanese, with a rail net four times that of China proper. She had large reserves of gold and dollar exchange. Yet the country was torn by armed conflict that made progress impossible. General Marshall's efforts at mediation in 1946 crashed on the old familiar rock of the Generalissimo's stubbornness. Six months after Marshall's departure from China, Chiang's State Council declared general mobilization against the Communists.

The Red Flag Advances

By the beginning of 1949, with Communists driving close to his capital at Nanking, Chiang fled, leaving his duties to Vice-President Li Tsung-jen. He was later reported to hav taken $300,000,000 in gold with hi to Formosa. Since then the Commu nists have swept forward, to Hankov to Shanghai, to the gates of Canto Their hand was strengthened by ca ture of large quantities of US equi ment furnished Chiang in wartime. A the China debate reaches the Gener Assembly, the Nationalist forces a being pushed farther and farthe south toward Indochina.

What the nations, both East an West, would like to know as the plunge into the great debate ove China, is what goes on in the mind o Mao Tze-tung. Is he a Communist o Russian ilk? A national Communis of the Tito variety? Is he a bonafid convert to Sun Yat-sen's Three Prin ciples—the very principles of Wes ern democracy?

Mao himself is not apt to state hi convictions. He doubtless knows tha his followers are split between Stalin ist, nationalist, and Sun Yat-se trends. Manchuria and Sinkiang a within Russia's orbit of influenc and China's border with the Soviet i like the US border with Canada.

Mao has admitted that he faces di ficulties in consolidating his victory The peasants are pleased with his po icy of giving them land, which is wh 4,000,000 have fought for him. Bu economic distress still affects them as it does the workers in the citie until trade, new industries, rural an urban technology can step up produc tion and prosperity in the whole land Mao's China needs all the trade it ca get with the West. It needs financia aid, technical aid, and other forms o assistance lavished on the Generalis simo. Nor is it certain it can hope fo these from the USSR, which has no yet returned machinery it remove from factories in Manchuria.

In addition to the Soviet-bloc na tions and Yugoslavia, Britain, Franc and India show strong leaning towar recognition of Mao's government Britain has a billion-and-a-half dol lars investment in China at stake.

The US is wary. She would like t know the strength of the pro-Russia elements behind Mao. Having bee burned once in China in the name o democracy, the United States hesitate to go near the fire.

Pincer Attack on Misery

This General Assembly may be remembered in history for having launched the most sweeping campaign ever devised to combat hunger. The bold new Technical Assistance Program was inspired by President Truman's Point Four.

By JOHN YARD

"IF TRADE does not cross national boundaries, eventually armies will."

US representative Wilson M. Compton was speaking before the General Assembly. He was urging approval for the ambitious new United Nations program of technical aid to backward countries. The great UN project is the blueprint for releasing a flow of prosperity into the world's breeding places of despair and hostility.

The detailed plans have required months of labor by the Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies. It is their answer to President Truman's famous "Point Four" challenge to "worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty and freedom."

The UN had previously offered limited technical advice to member nations, while the United States has been spreading agricultural "know-how" throughout Latin-America. The President's inaugural address last January dramatized the plight of the people in the underdeveloped areas, and the danger to world security of leaving them behind.

In the Assembly, support for the new UN Program of Technical Assistance came quickly, from Soviet-bloc nations as well as from the West. Juliusz Katz-Suchy, Polish delegate, praised it warmly—despite his suspicion that the whole idea had originated in a desire of the United States to use the UN as a "scout" for US investments. There was, in fact, broader agreement in the UN than in the US Congress, where Republicans recently shivered at the news that the US must spend $35,000,000 for its share in the UN program and its own "Point Four." All the same, the US is sure to back technical aid to undeveloped regions. For one thing, as Agriculture Secretary Brannan observed, "Only *developed* countries are good customers."

Pincer Attack on Misery *continued*

UN Technical Assistance is a pincer movement, with two main columns advancing against human misery. The first will be directed toward help in building native industries; the second —and perhaps the most important— toward developing methods for getting more food out of native soil. Alongside these two fighting columns will go specialists in many allied fields. Engineers will give advice on power facilities, transport and housing. Public health doctors will combat causes of disease and epidemics. Education experts will cope with illiteracy, train city and farm workers in new skills.

Self-help is the keynote of the campaign. There will be no handouts for governments, nor even canned goods for the hungry. Experience has proved that these methods do not work. In fact, there will be no help at all, unless the nation asking it shows good faith by mobilizing all its own resources for raising the living standard. In most cases, such countries will meet a third of the costs for expert advice on modernization.

Industrial development in the backward countries may take a long time. It will have to wait on capital investment. These countries must start in a small way, as America once did. Industries will slowly reproduce their own capital, and expand as purchasing power increases. Hardest to find will be the management skills, which the Soviet Union ridicules, but which are important and difficult to impart.

Only by slow growth can a people find the forms of industrial progress best suited to them. As one observer put it: "What makes modern industry is ultimately not the machine, but the brains which use it. To regard it as an ingenious contrivance, like a mechanical toy, is naive to the point of absurdity. It is like supposing that, in order to acclimatize Chinese script in the West, it would be sufficient to introduce Chinese brushes and ink."

Yet there is overwhelming need for grafting new habits of life on the old. This is especially true in Asia, where more than a billion people dwell under sub-standard conditions. From Peiping in north China, where Mao-Tze-tung now has his capital, to Burma, Indochina, Siam, Malaya and Indonesia, there is a varying pattern of distress. Swinging eastward, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Palestine all have their urgent modernization problems.

Home industries and thriving handicrafts in Asia have everywhere been swept out of international trade and even out of native markets by the avalanche of cheap manufactures from the West. New products must be developed which by their consumer appeal, their price and quality, at least can compete in domestic and inter-Asian trade.

In many parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the people have insufficient food despite the fact that half or three-quarters of them till the soil. Ancient farming methods fail to meet the task of providing for ever-increasing population. More effective tools and small-scale implements, better seeds and fertilizers would work miracles. Sometimes it is the human health factor that must be changed. People who are constantly victims of malaria, dysentery, typhus or cholera, cannot adequately provide for themselves.

UN Technical Assistance will attack these industrial and rural problems judiciously, being careful not to create new ones—new city slums or underpaid workers, new cesspools of disease and infant mortality and "class struggle."

Big Job for Specialized Agencies

The role of the specialized agencies is great. Only industrial expansion will be handled directly by the UN Secretariat. Even here the agencies will have much to do. For instance, the International Labor Organization (ILO) will advise on standards for employment, wages and hours, worker safety, social security and labor relations. It will also perform similar functions in respect to technical aid for rural areas.

Farmers everywhere in the world are concerned with such things as soil and water, crop plants and animals, pastures and feed stuffs, tools and m terials, and some source of powe whether muscle or machine. And Food and Agricultural Organizat (FAO) has had wide experience helping them. It has given advice irrigation and draining to Eg Lebanon, Greece, China, Peru, Si and Poland. It has made soil mana ment surveys in Latin America, So East Asia and Italy; surveys on ne for farm machinery in Poland China. It has studied problems of r growing, insect control, the stamp out of locust plagues. In many ar it has had successful projects in li stock and poultry improvement, forestation, logging, modernization age-old fishing techniques.

It is therefore natural that F should handle the whole agricultu end of technical assistance. This w include training of rural extens workers, and guidance in setting rural cooperatives for soil mana ment, insect control, purchase of r chinery and many other things. F will advise governments how to h their farmers with marketing pr lems.

FAO's new proposal for setting a worldwide commodity cleari house is distinct from the UN Tech cal Assistance Program. But, if cepted by the governments, it m help combat famine in some of t underdeveloped areas. Food surplu exist chiefly in hard currency co tries. There may soon be surp wheat in North America, sugar Cuba, rice in some parts of La America. The Clearing House wo purchase these surpluses, and s them, either at a reduced price i currency acceptable to the supplyi country, or at the going rate in t currency of the receiving country. convertible currencies built up in t Clearing House would be used to pand world trade in other commo ties. FAO would thus serve as "bridge" between lands of plenty a those of want.

Health a Technical Problem

Malnutrition, filth and ignoran are major causes of disease a death in many regions. And the r of the World Health Organization Technical Aid will be second only

that of FAO. The medical experts will aim at coping with far more than outbreaks of diphtheria, smallpox or yellow fever. Their major approach will be on the constructive side: showing local authorities how to set up boards of health, maternal and child health clinics and VD services. They will suggest ways of improving local nutrition, sanitation and public understanding of health care. Demonstration teams will set up projects for control of malaria, plague, cholera and venereal diseases, and will move on to other areas as soon as a local staff is able to take over.

In various regions WHO has already chalked up a magnificent record in wiping out malaria. Its ultimate purpose is to eradicate this and other insect-borne diseases from the entire world, by simultaneous spraying campaigns in areas where malaria prevails.

Three-quarters of the world's population are still victims of diseases resulting from poor sewage disposal, unsafe water supply, uncontrolled insects and inadequate protection of milk and food. Infant mortality from these causes is appalling. Yet experience in Mexico, in the Amazon Valley and in Venezuela has shown that cost of a community water supply is one-fifth that of carting water for sale into the village square.

Teaching and demonstration are thus important features of the health program. In these the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) will have much to contribute. It is prepared to offer advice to governments in overcoming illiteracy, and in giving adults training in many subjects — health care, farm methods, rural industry— by means of films, exhibits and radio as well as books.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will help chart air routes to span jungles, mountains, deserts and water barriers where other forms of transport are difficult or impossible. It will aid governments to set up ground installations. Finally, the International Bank will advise on the feasibility, costs and other financial aspects of these many reconstruction and development plans throughout the world.

INDONESIAN mothers are given practical demonstration in child care by a WHO representative.

Who Needs UN Technical Aid

Average income **in the US per head in 1947 was $1400; in 25 countries with more than half the world's population, it was less than $100 per year.**

The earth's population **will rise from 2 billion to 3 billion in the next 50 years. Demands of the underprivileged peoples for food, clothing and shelter may cause global war.**

The under-developed countries **contain vast resources that can serve all nations. Asia has 43.4 per cent of the world's oil and almost all its rubber.**

Steps in UN Technical Aid

1. *A Survey* is made to find out what the country needs;

2. *A Team of Experts* helps plan projects and financing;

3. *Researchers* study use of agricultural and mineral resources;

4. *A Training Program* builds a corps of native technicians;

5. *New Ideas* in farming, manufacturing, are tested in pilot projects.

6. *Literature* on problems of the area is distributed.

RINDERPEST can be eradicated by vaccine made with virus grown inside hen's eggs, reports FAO.

Control Atomic Energy and

Outlaw the Atomic Bomb

By SIR BENEGAL NARSING RAU

Vice Chairman, UN International Law Commission

Sir Benegal Narsing Rau is India's Permanent UN Representative, with the rank of Ambassador. He was Chairman of the sub-committee on Atomic Energy at the General Assembly in Paris a year ago. In India he is looked on virtually as the "father" of the new Constitution.

A DECLARATION by the General Assembly, advocating effective international control of the use of atomic energy and condemning the use of the atomic bomb by any nation would be an effective step towards a final solution of the peril that faces mankind. That solution must be sought and found if the human race is to survive.

On November 4, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the Atomic Energy Commission to resume work. On July 29, 1949, the Commission came to the conclusion that no further discussion could be useful, unless the six permanent members of the Commission (Britain, Canada, China, France, the US and the USSR) reported a basis for agreement. The deadlock continues to the present time.

Recently we were informed that another country had just exploded an atomic bomb, thus increasing the potential menace of this new weapon to the world. There are many who feel that it would be unfortunate if at the precise moment when action to outlaw the bomb is most urgently needed, the United Nations allowed the task of finding a solution to be held up by a deadlock.

If we turn to history for a precedent in dealing with the atomic peril, we may conclude that it is a mistake to expect or to insist upon unanimity in respect to adoption of a comprehensive plan of atomic controls at the very start. We must not refuse to sow the seed, merely because the whole tree will not come into being at once.

Only fifteen nations supported the Hague Declaration on Poison Gas in 1899. Yet forty nations signed the protocol in 1925—some of them with reservations. By 1945 the outlawing of poison gas in warfare became in effect universal. Experience shows that an international Convention signed by a majority of nations gradually becomes international law. For behind all law lies the for of public opinion, which if strong enough tends to ma itself felt and obeyed.

Certain general findings and recommendations of t Atomic Energy Commission have already been approv by the General Assembly. Those which cast duties up states in respect to atomic energy should be incorporat in precise language in the Declaration.

Some fifty nations might support such a Declarati today. When approved by the General Assembly, it mig create no legal obligations even for the Member States the United Nations; but like the Declaration of Hum Rights passed by the General Assembly in Decemb 1948, this special declaration of the duties of states cou have a powerful moral and educative effect.

Such a declaration could, if the General Assembly r quested, be prepared by the International Law Comm sion, which has just drawn up and submitted a Declar tion on the General Rights and Duties of States. T Declaration would, amongst other things, state that: the development of atomic energy is no longer a matt of domestic concern of individual States; 2) no Sta must use atomic weapons against any State which accep an effective system of international control in this matt

After this Atomic Declaration had accomplished its ta of enrolling world public opinion, the General Assemb could attempt to frame a Convention which would set agencies for atomic energy control and thereby impleme the Declaration.

Our greatest ally in the solution of the atomic proble is, after all, world opinion. We must call upon it witho delay, and mobilize it behind the most decisive action th can be taken at this time.

SPRUILLE BRADEN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (See his Article, Page 50)

WORLD TRADE

section

Has the Dollar a Future in Europe?
by Pierre Bonvoisin

Afghanistan Is Not as Far as You Think
by the Editors

Umpire for World Trade: International Arbitration

It Settles Disputes Both Public and Private In a Civilized Profitable Way . . .

By SPRUILLE BRADEN

Although it was his blunt views on the Perón regime in Argentina that put Spruille Braden in the headlines, his name is really synonymous with closer, friendlier relations between Latin America and the United States. From 1933 forward he was a key figure in Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy. In that year he served as US delegate to the emotion-charged seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo. Two years later, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, he was sent as Chairman of the US delegation to the Chaco Peace Conference. A personal envoy of President Roosevelt, he acted as arbitrator in the final settlement of the war between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1939. The Braden style of diplomacy has been and remains tough and forthright, but flexible enough to work out the kind of compromise that resolves conflicts while saving face. Formerly Assistant Secretary of State, he has served as Ambassador to Cuba and Colombia as well as to Argentina. He is at present President of the American Arbitration Association.

WHILE world diplomats searc frantically for any kind of *modus vivendi,* for techniques o amity and agreement, a vast backlo of principles and procedures buil up by the arbitration of business dis putes deserves to be explored. These could well serve as guideposts i settling many discords between gov ernments. That is why, perhaps the International Law Commission o the General Assembly is studyin arbitration precepts and practices t see how these can be used to resolv international controversies.

In this respect, it should b pointed out, for example, that friend ly business relations are more likel to be resumed in the wake of dis putes settled by arbitration than afte law court litigation that usually last longer and costs more. Consider th case of two trading firms, the firs an American pie plate manufacture

ARBITRATION: WHERE IT WORKS

Inter-Governmental Organizations

UN Headquarters
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes

International Trade Organization
Arbitration of World Trade Disputes

International Civil Aviation Organization
Arbitration of Air Transport Disputes

American Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Arbitration of Economic Disputes

ERP—*Arbitration of Disputes on Compensation of US Citizens for Assets in Nationalized Industries*

Republic of Ecuador
Arbitration of Disputes over Import-Export Licenses

Peace Treaties of Axis Satellite Countries
Arbitration of Economic Disputes

Private Organizations

Chamber of Commerce, British Commonwealth
Arbitration of Disputes under International Contracts

American Bar Association
Arbitration of Disputes under International Contracts

International Bar Association
Arbitration of Disputes under International Contracts

International Law Association
Arbitration of Disputes under International Contracts

and the second, a Scandinavian pulp company, which agreed to arbitrate their differences in accord with a clause included in the original import contract.

The pie plate manufacturer had received a large shipment of pulp board from the Scandinavian company, ordered several months in advance. Upon arrival in the United States, however, the board proved to be thicker than the kind customarily used. As a result, the manufacturer had to reset all of his machines and secure new shipping containers. He therefore demanded damages, through the New York agent of the pulpwood company, basing his claim on the expense of machine resetting, the need to manufacture the larger containers, together with the delay these caused him in filling orders.

When the three arbitrators, chosen for their familiarity with pulp board and its products, obtained the evidence from both sides, they retired to consider their decision. While they were out of the hearing room, a salesman for the pulpwood company suggested to the pie plate manufacturer that he ought to place an order for still another shipload of pulp board since he soon would be running out of stock. The American thought that the salesman was somewhat presumptuous in trying to get another order from a customer who had already been caused no end of trouble through his failure to provide merchandise in accord with the buyer's specifications and needs. Nevertheless, a deal was made with the proviso that if the pulpwood board this time was thicker than usual, the pie plate manufacturer would get the same allowance for damages as the one the arbitrators would award to him in the proceedings then going on. This resumption of friendly business contact is almost impossible to imagine were it a case of two disputants spending days before a judge and jury. Incidentally, the result of the arbitration was that an allowance was granted to the manufacturer to cover the entire costs of resetting the machines and adopting a new size container.

Similarly, an Australian shipper had contracted with a well-known New York fur importer with whom he had done business for years for the purchase of 1600 raw Australian opossum skins. The negotiations which led up to the final order consisted of one telephone call from Sydney to New York and a few subsequent cable and letter exchanges which set forth the quality of the goods to be shipped. A table showing the assortment of skins was sent by air mail to the New York buyer. No

International Arbitration *continued*

written contract, however, existed between the Australian and the American. When the goods were delivered in New York, the importer discovered that they hardly came up to the description given him over the phone and in his view did not represent proper value for the price paid. He requested an arbitration hearing which was arranged. The seller agreed to present his case by letter and on the evidence of the skins shipped from Sydney. The arbitrators who were experts in this field inspected everyone of the 1600 skins and found that they accorded with specifications. They refused to pass on the question of "good value" as they knew this term in the fur trade is extremely subjective and what might be good value to buyer A might be very poor value to buyer B. The decision, therefore, went in the Australian's favor.

Then again, a midwestern machine tool manufacturer hired an agent in London for the sale of its products. In 1944, he found that he was owed some $10,000 for tools and equipment which had been shipped to his English agency. The latter claimed that they could not remit because the British Government through various war regulations did not authorize them to transmit funds to the United States, and that also there was some dispute as to the actual sum involved. Moreover, some civil servant of the British Government had also tentatively ruled that these tools and equipment should be included in the Lend Lease arrangement with the United States Government.

Acting on the arbitration clause in the contract, the midwestern manufacturer demanded a hearing and the matter was referred to three arbitrators in New York City. The arbitrators, incidentally, were (1) a well-known accountant who would be capable of analyzing corporation and consignment reports, (2) an officer in a large tool and equipment firm familiar with trade practices in the sale of international machinery, and (3) the vice-president of an important New York bank specializing in foreign trade and foreign exchange. They decided in favor of the midwestern concern, awarding it some 90 per cent of its claim. The award was afterward sent to London and judgment was entered on it in a high court of justice in the King's Bench Division which confirmed the validity of the award made in New York.

THESE examples, which could be multiplied by the thousands, offer vivid and significant evidence of arbitration as an effective instrument in settling international business disputes.

It is therefore doubly heartening to men of good will to note that arbitration is expressly mentioned in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter as one method for peacefully settling disputes.* UN member-states are obliged to resort to arbitration. It is this kind of bilateral arrangement between disputants that in the past has best served the cause of peace—not often enough, indeed, but more often than is generally assumed.

International arbitration has an impressive record of achievement not only in international business, but also among the volatile small nations of the Western Hemisphere.

Arbitration has helped to resolve such inter-American differences as the Chaco Boreal dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. These two countries, from the time of their birth and especially from 1879 to 1932, had laid claim to territory located in the center of South America. These title claims were extremely complicated, both from the historical and juridical aspects. They were rendered still more involved by internal politics and by national pride, and a bitter three-year war ending in 1935 further antagonized the two peoples. This controversy finally was resolved to everybody's satisfaction by means of authoritative arbitration, although many observers had thou it impossible to bring the ex-bell erents to any meeting of the mi whatsoever.

In 1935, a Peace Conference w called of six mediatory pow (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, U guay and the United States America). They were to recon differences between Bolivia a Paraguay. The final award was r only accepted without reservation b was acclaimed by both Bolivia a Paraguay.

The Chaco boundary proceedin in which the writer participated Chairman of the US Delegation the Peace Conference and later as arbitrator, were not only importa in determining boundary lines b also in bringing peace and in demo strating the value of arbitration the only final instrument which cou be used by the mediators to fost the conclusive settlement.

If international arbitration is play an effective and valuable r in either business or government d putes, certain principles have to observed: (1) both sides must agr to settle the controversy peaceful and select impartial and compete persons to serve as factfinders, me ators, conciliators or arbitrators. (Both sides must have ample opp tunity to be heard. (3) Decisio have to be fair and final. (4) Bo the parties and arbitrators must d play integrity and actively coopera to guarantee a just decision accept in a spirit of tolerance.

The principles derived from Ame ican experience in resolving intern tional disputes coincide with the pra tices employed by such agencies as t American Arbitration Associati (since 1926) and the Inter-Americ Commercial Arbitration Commissi (since 1933) in the field of intern tional trade. Disagreements betwe nationals and corporations of diffe ent countries have been often su mitted to these arbitration agencie they also consider disputes betwe foreign governments and priva manufacturers in a different count on such questions as the execution war contracts, delivery of goods a engineering services. Their intern tional panels of expert arbitrat

* "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

drawn from different nationalities facilitate speedy, inexpensive and equitable settlement. It would be unwise and even disastrous perhaps to neglect this method of harmonizing trade disputes, especially today with increased activity on the part of state-controlled agencies and state-owned corporations in foreign trade.

Trade disputes can spawn resentments and animosities which prejudice social and political relations and friendships among the peoples of the world. They must be prevented or nipped in the bud or in any case, amicably settled. This fact may become more important than ever if, in keeping with President Truman's Point 4, the "bold new program" to assist underdeveloped areas of the world, the flow of private capital and know-how and show-how to all parts of the earth is reinitiated and invigorated. Substantial foreign investments are not likely to be made unless investors can rely on machinery established for the speedy and fair settlement of issues which necessarily will arise. Sincere and serious efforts looking to the solution of trade dissensions and business misunderstandings are indispensable to mutual prosperity, goodwill, respect and trust among nations.

Since World War I, many gains have been made in the practice of international arbitration. They should not be lost. Various standards and techniques have been established on how to formulate issues to be submitted, how to choose arbitrators, how to conduct proceedings and to make the award. The following principles in both political and commercial arbitration, might well be pondered as a basis for adjusting of international controversy and for developing arbitral methods:

(1) *Voluntary Nature of Arbitration.* To submit an international dispute to arbitration requires the voluntary agreement or mutual consent of all parties. Any agreement which seeks, by implication or otherwise, to authorize the settlement of disputes concerning a nation not a party to it, violates a fundamental principle of arbitration. It introduces an element of coercion from which arbitration always should be free.

(2) *Elective Right to Self-Regulation.* To choose self-regulatory methods of settlement of disputes is a long established prior right of the parties. They can resort to a pacific method of settlement-negotiation, mediation, conciliation, inquiry, arbitration or judicial determination. Their right to choose their own mediators, conciliators, arbitrators or judges is equally well established.

(3) *Preference for Impartial Settlements.* The parties generally prefer to select their conciliators, mediators, or arbitrators, whether for a permanent board to hear several disputes, or for a board to deal with a particular case. The right to a hearing is fundamental to impartial settlements.

(4) *Arbitral Decisions are Final and Binding.* Parties in controversy may elect to use the bargaining processes of negotiation, conciliation, mediation or fact-finding. But once they go before arbitrators, the arbitral award should be regarded as final. Parties in their arbitration agreement usually state in good faith that they will be bound by the arbitral award.

(5) *Advance Commitment to Arbitrate Future Disputes.* The commitment to arbitrate should be made part of the agreement, convention or other international instrument at the time it is executed. It should be applicable to future disputes arising out of or in relation to that agreement. This provision may refer all or specific disputes to preliminary processes of conciliation or inquiry, with arbitration as the last process, or only to arbitration, as the parties may prefer.

(6). *Specific Reference to Permanently Pre-established Facilities.* Organized arbitration is a principle and practice which is becoming more and more important in international relations. Either before an arbitration agreement is concluded or concurrently with its adoption, machinery should be accessible to parties in a dispute for the fulfillment of their arbitral obligation. The functions of permanently established arbitration facilities are (1) to provide rules of procedure; (2) to set up permanent panels or experts able to serve as conciliators, fact-finders or arbitrators. This avoids delays and provides both mechanical and administrative services.

The degree to which the standards for peacefully settling disputes are accepted as binding on the peoples of the United Nations will testify to the vitality and sincerity of the movement toward civilized and harmonious international relations.

ARBITRATOR EXAMINES EQUIPMENT UNDER DISPUTE ON PLANT FLOOR

Has the Dollar A Future in Europe ?

The "Buy America" clause in ECA can make the whole program a crutch instead of a cure

By PIERRE BONVOISIN

Vice-President, Banque de la Société Générale, Brussels

BELGIUM has always been in favor of a free trade system since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Because it has been for decades the most densely populated country in the world, it has never been self-supporting. On the contrary, it has always depended on foreign countries. It has had to import as much as two-thirds of its foodstuffs and three-fourths of the raw materials required to feed its industry. Having only very scarce natural resources to start with, except for the coal of its mines and nitrogen from its atmosphere (used only, of course when the chemical industry came into being), Belgium has always had to count on its exports to find the foreign exchange required to pay for its vital imports.

This makes it easy to understand why the Belgians have always b strong advocates of free trade— freer the better—and why they variably support all devices and te niques tending to create larger more open markets. Even dur World War II the Belgian Gove ment-in-exile was facing up to question of Belgium's place in wo trade during the post-war period began negotiations to establish a a toms union between the Netherla and Belgium and Luxembourg— well-known Benelux. [*Editor's No* So far, the Benelux "partners" h been unable to achieve the g of full union which was concei originally as an arrangement tween equals; but unfortunately aftermath of the war has left Netherlands economically in a weaker position than either Belgi or Luxembourg. Nevertheless, e under this restricted customs un there will be various monetary a trade agreements to benefit all th and to buttress and enlarge th place in world trade.] Certainly Benelux ideal is something tow which we should constantly stri for it was designed in miniature foster greater freedom in inter tional commercial transactions.

That freedom, so far as West Europe is concerned, is insepara identified with the fate of the W ern European economy beyond 19 when the Marshall Plan ends. Th is a widespread feeling in Europe government and business circles t the world's economic life is in state of suspension, in a transit which will come to a close in 19 It seems to me, therefore, that enough creative imagination is be applied to what is going to happ on January 1, 1953. Surely Eur and the rest of the world cannot pect the US to continue perpetua to dispense its generous econo aid. Hence, it seems to me that we are going to derive the advanta of the long-range view, the per after 1952 has to become the No preoccupation of responsible bu ness men and government offici throughout Western Europe. None us have the right to feel satisfied to rest on our oars merely beca some of our present difficulties

eing overcome. We must take advantage of the 1949-1952 period of elief and recovery to plan intelligently for the future.

Basic to that future is the need to chieve a more widespread and more lexible variety of world trade. To do his, all nations with a stake in world commerce will have to decrease the umber and extent of their control, estrictive and discriminatory measures. They will have to lower tariffs ven beyond the GATT and the recent Annecy arrangements. We all will ave to go back to genuinely *multilateral* transactions as against the resent tendency to enter into *bilateral* agreements. Trade must be rom A to B to C to D to E to F, nd from F back to A and B and C gain if we are to move successfully oward our objective of expanding oth trade and production on a global scale.

Aside from essentially technical ures, we have to take a very realistic ook at some fundamentals. The reason that the world finds it so hard o return to economic equilibrium oday is not to be found alone in the multiplicity of regulations and impediments to the interchange of goods and services. Rather it is because some countries have not yet got back to hard work—to the kind f sweat and toil and solid craftsman-like work that are the indispensables of internal prosperity and xternal trade. Altogether too many ountries still inflate the purchasing ower of their currency to heights ar above its real ability to command he commodities of other nations on he world market. There are, of ourse, countries which, as a result f the war, have been deprived of so nany of their mining and manufacuring and transportation facilities hat they are really unable to retart on any sound footing without utside assistance.

But even if we do accomplish some atisfactory results from the lowering f tariffs, for example, and from a ore effective synchronizing of onetary policy and by getting a ore adequate supply of hard curency, we will then have only solved e problem of the transition period. he central problem, that of 1952 and beyond, will remain to be solved. That is why I stress again and again that we Western Europeans must not be too indolent, must not rely on others constantly to prime the pump of our prosperity, and must rather search out our own ways and means for coping with the many challenges that will come up during the period of transition marking the close of ECA and the time of no help.

As one step in that direction and as a method to reduce the strain on the American economy, I would like to suggest that the methods of ECA aid now in vogue be modified along the following lines. Up till the present, the underlying philosophy of ECA aid has been primarily based on the bilateral flow of transactions. The result has been that the normal currents of trade have been rendered unduly sluggish, and an unnatural exchange of goods and services, sometimes at much higher cost, too often encouraged. This indeed is one of the almost inevitable defects of bilateral trading in contrast to the multilateral kind. The distribution of ECA aid is founded on the deficit of each country; yet this omits the vital consideration that the deficit might derive at least in part from misguided internal policies. The ECA directorate must candidly decide whether if it continues to make the deficit the criterion of aid it will not merely favor perpetuation of harmful practices which otherwise would have to be changed. Moreover, the ECA mechanism requires that the counterpart of drawing rights placed at the disposal of others has to be used in the US for the purchase of a specific list of products. Consequently, the nation which has the counter value of these drawing rights has to refrain from buying from economic areas either adjacent to its own or complementary to it. The chance to export to these traditional customers is thus restricted, and the chance to import from them is at the same time reduced. Once again the normal currents of trade are diverted from their course. How could they be put back into their historic and necessary channels in 1952? In this connection I would like to suggest the adoption of a new point of view.

Now the US is actually assisting Europe toward economic regeneration. The people of the US have accepted this policy and are paying out their taxes to have it put into effect. Would it really be more detrimental to the American economy if the ECA did not insist on seeing to it that each ECA recipient country buy directly from the US for the amount of dollars received? Would not the whole ECA program in the long run and the whole American economy benefit from a system designed to respect and restore normal currents of trade so that they will be available when American aid ceases? Let us suppose that country A, having received dollars no matter under what ECA category, will be permitted to use those dollars as it pleases to offset a deficit toward country

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

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

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Dollar's Future in Europe *continued*

Belgium is a little country with a big place in world trade. In the atomic age uranium from the Belgian Congo is proving even more profitable than the famous ivory preserves in the day of King Leopold I. The following figures illustrate Belgium's ever-expanding share in world trade.

	1948	*First 6 mos. 1949*
Imports	$199,812	$107,190
Exports	169,029	112,771

B. Certainly this would seem to be immaterial to the American economy. For it is likely that dollars will remain a scarce currency until 1952. Thus country B will not hoard them but will either buy from the US or use them to offset a deficit toward a third country. In this case it is, however, inevitable that no matter how many other countries act in this same way, the dollars would eventually come back to the US to pay for exports from it. These dollars, therefore, will have had the same effect, although a somewhat delayed effect on the American economy. The US in sum total will have sold neither more nor less. But in the meantime, these dollars being circulated will, on the way, have played a creative role in normalizing the trade balance of many a country without impairing its standard methods of doing business.

If it is the underlying purpose of ECA to help Europe to get back to normalcy, are we not justified in thinking that dollars applied in this manner will be more profitably utilized then under the strict rules of present ECA procedure? Surely this new freedom of the ECA dollar could strengthen and quicken all moves toward that convertibility of currencies which is crucial to enduring prosperity not only for Western Europe but for the world as a whole.

The present status of European currencies is also dangerous for a country which can meet its financial commitments even under bilater agreements but which at all tim has to take the risk of being pa eventually in a money which ne day may have become non-conver ble.

To accumulate such non-transfe able balances places any exporti country at the mercy of its debto It shrinks the whole fabric of inte national trade since it decreases t ability of a country, which is goi forward in its economic rehabilit tion, to import from others anywhe near as much as it would like a should. *I contend that if the EC dollar could become transferable the manner I here suggest, it wou soon become the nucleus for the i ternational money, that global cu rency so urgently required ever sin sterling ceased to be convertible.* seems to me that this would not contrary to the US philosophy a practice of free trade. It seems me that the entire financial structu of the American economy, not on in terms of its Federal Treasury a its participation in the World Ba and Monetary Fund but also t outlook and experience of priva bankers, has prepared America assume this outstanding respon bility. I am convinced that it w have to assume it, soon or late, f its own sake and for the sake achieving the objectives of the EC and to enlarge international trade a world where economic stability the indispensable prologue to pea

AFGHANISTAN

Is Not As Far As You Think

An Area Intelligence Report
On Business Opportunities
In a Little Known Asiatic Country

BY THE EDITORS OF UNW

One of the few regimes which is using government economic planning and initiative to foster free enterprise is the constitutional monarchy of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan. For the past 30 years, it has been forced to mobilize funds and personnel to meet the country's industrial needs. Now it is launched upon a new vigorous program to invite foreign capital to develop the fabulous, hardly-known resources of Afghanistan.

It is step by step reducing its participation in commercial ventures. Indeed, today it retains shares only in the electrical and textile fields. Otherwise, the trend is away from government ownership and toward the encouragement of national and foreign businessmen. It does however, maintain full authority over credit and currency; but during the past year, it has relaxed its controls over foreign exchange on sales other than caracul fur, today its first item of export.

Like other Middle Eastern countries —Afghanistan presents the paradox of a poor people dwelling in a land of incredible potential amplitude. Preliminary surveys, for example, indicate reasonably rich oil deposits which extend throughout the northern region, but no oil has yet been drilled. A one-year outlay of $500,000 could lay the groundwork for a four-year development program for drilling and pumping oil that would cover the country's own requirements and build toward ever-increasing exports.

Similarly, less than 1 per cent of Afghanistan's rich coal deposits are being mined. Amazingly small outlays here would suffice to increase the current output five-fold. Lead and chrome, zinc and beryl are similarly untapped, awaiting capital, technicians, equipment and transportation.

To grasp the extent to which Afghanistan remains in the forefront of underdeveloped areas, at which Point 4 and the UN technical assistance programs are aimed, as well as to point up the opportunities it offer to risk or venture capital, a thumb-nail portrait of the Afghanistan economy should help.

Afghanistan, located high in the heartlands of Asia, contains twelve million people in a country smaller than Texas. Like Switzerland, it is a landlocked plateau, criss-crossed by mountain ranges crested with snow.

They tower 20,000 feet above sea level. Below are the deserts, craggy hills and valleys as green as Ireland's. Three million nomads wander with caracul sheep and cattle and horses over extensive grazing lands. The rest are farmers who depend for their water supply on rivers and subterranean channels, since rainfall is scarce. A temperate climate and loamy soil result in fine crops of wheat, corn, barley, rice, cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, vegetables, fruits and nuts. Most of the industrial establishments process agricultural products: cotton and woolen mills, match and furniture factories. The handicrafts concentrate on carpets, stone-carving and weaving.

Since its independence in 1918, Afghanistan has been striving to improve public education, and communications, raise agricultural output and establish

Afghanistan *continued*

industries, all designed to lift the generally depressed living standards. As in other undeveloped countries, technology has lagged centuries behind that of North America and Western Europe. Private enterprise has not been strong enough to assume the risks involved in productive projects. The task of stimulating industry and investment therefore had to be assumed by government, which today is sparking the drive to develop more entrepreneural activity in both domestic and foreign quarters.

The government in concert with farmers and shepherds has steadily and rapidly increased the production and export of caracul skins ("Persian lamb"). In the nineteen twenties 700,000 skins were exported annually; by the late nineteen forties 2,500,000 were being annually exported. This resulted from a campaign (financed and promoted by *Banke Millie,* the commercial bank of Afghanistan) in which individual merchants and companies pooled their efforts. Caracul merchants abroad pooled their sales promotion in organizations like the Afghan-American Trading Company in New York where most of the furs are sold today.

To maintain the superiority of Afghan caraculs in quality and price, (during 1948, Afghan caracul furs were valued by New York Customs Offices at $9.63 each and Africans at $7.48) the Afghan caracul industry must be able to use new techniques: "irons" to multiply the curl or change its pattern, scientific cross-breeding to improve stock, modern preserving and packing methods to reduce spoilage.

The desire to move ahead in other branches of agriculture offer opportunities to American capital, science, technology and managerial ability. Although low rainfall, inadequate supplies of fertilizers, primitive methods, and lack of soil conservation have hampered improvement in yields, energetic administration of modern land management methods have increased the number of acres cultivated. Thus in the north some 85,000 acres were brought under cultivation during the thirties and provided the basis for: (1) resuming raw cotton exports which had stopped in 1916, (2) establishing cotton textile mills, and (3) cultivating beet sugar and building a sugar refinery. About 350,000 more acres of fertile and in the north await irrigation while another 120,000 need drainage.

In the winding Helmand Valley to the southwest, once the site of a flourishing civilization based on intricate hand-built irrigation works, another 700,000 and 800,000 acres could be brought under cultivation for grain and cotton and pasture. But first a 3,000,000 acre-feet (i. e. 1 foot of water over 1 acre of land) reservoir has to be constructed to control the river and modern canals built to protect the water supply against seepage and evaporation.

Fruit growing requires American methods in scientific tree treatment, fertilizer, and grading and drying. I proved processing and storage faci ties could readily triple the export fruit—already constituting one-thi of Afghanistan's total exports. In t last 20 years Afghanistan has beco India's primary supplier of fruit a nuts—important substitutes in the I dian diet for the fats and meat pr scribed by the Hindu religion.

To further reclamation and irrig tion projects, Afghanistan is spendi $18 million with American constru tion and engineering firms to provi hydrotechnic installations, mode roads and experimental farms. This merely the beginning; similar expe ditures are already on the books.

By this winter Helmand water verted by a new dam will reach t first 6,000 acres of new land, now ar and uninhabited. With the completi of all other pending projects, cott exports could be trebled, beet sug production doubled, and enough fo produced to ensure a reasonable sta dard of living. This agricultural e pansion is expected to add some thir million dollars to the value of t national production now estimated two hundred and fifty million dolla Meanwhile the expansion program building toward an ever-larger mark for irrigation control machinery a farming tools and equipment.

Since investment in productive e terprise had not been the pattern the country's merchants the gover ment started in 1932 to contribu capital and grant monopoly rights a score of commercial and industri undertakings founded as joint sto companies and known as *shirkats.*

A Typical Afghanistan Panorama: A V

a channel for investments, the *Banke Millie Afghan* (Afghan National Bank), the first commercial bank in the country, was organized in 1932. Under its leadership, the business community was introduced to the potentialities of joint stock ventures. Within a decade more than 100 *shirkats,* among them the Sugar and Petroleum Company (1934), and the Caracul Company (1934), were sponsored, promoted, or partly financed by the government and *Banke Millie.* The latter not only undertook most of the financial liabilities of the first *shirkats,* but also conducted their foreign trade.

One of the most significant creations of *Banke Millie* was the Textile Company, founded in 1935. Its first 50-loom mill, acquired from the government by private entrepreneurs and a newly-built 550-loom mill (with a power station) soon reached their annual capacity output of 8.5 million meters of cloth and one million pounds of yarn, which are sold to individual (hand) weavers. There is a ready market for an eight-fold expansion of the company's operations, but this was delayed first by scarcity of English and American machinery and then by a shortage of foreign exchange. Meanwhile the company earns about 15 per cent annually on its paid-in capital (before dividends). Sugar, and soap enterprises, originally fostered by *Banke Millie,* and the projected cement and brick establishments offer similar economic opportunities.

Hydro-electric power from the untapped river waters rushing down the Hindu Kush Mountains—are urgently required for Afghanistan's economic expansion. Two large and at least three smaller hydo-electric power stations would meet the foreseeable needs of flour mills, textile plants, and cement factories. Contracts for building two of these power stations are being negotiated. A third contract remains to be let. Between $12 and $14 million for electric power projects will be raised from existing company reserves and bank credit by a consortium of the joint stock companies, assisted by *Banke Millie* and the central bank.

Since vast improvements are needed in the highway network, a road-building program is high on the priority list of government projects. Surveys for resurfacing and partial rerouting of some 275 miles have been finished and construction on 75 miles of one important link with Pakistan was completed in July 1949.

It is to the United States that Afghans in government and business are looking for both seed-bed capital and mid-20th Century know-how.

(The Editors express their appreciation for the cooperation of the UN, the US Department of Commerce and Dr. Abdul Rauf, of the Afghan Ministry of National Economy, in compiling data for this report.)

Some of the World's Highest Production Gains Are Anticipated From the Afghan Development Program. Here Are a Few Examples:

(1) For every $1 invested, 84¢ worth of new crop will result from agricultural and irrigation investments in the Arghandab Valley covering 120,000 acres.

(2) For every $1 invested, 66¢ worth of new crop will result from agricultural and irrigation investments in the Helmand Valley covering 352,000 acres.

(3) For each $1 invested, 56¢ worth of new production will result annually from cotton textile mills producing more than 50 million yards of cotton cloth a year.

(4) For every $1 invested, 33¢ worth of new production will result annually from cement plants producing 45,000 tons a year.

the 300-Mile Long Arghandab Valley

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Is an Atomic Blitz Possible?

By FLETCHER PRATT

(Continued from page 16)

a sudden atomic onslaught on the transportation systems of Nation B.

The destructiveness and the horror effect of the atom bomb are so great that it is a political as well as a military weapon, and its political effect on potential neutrals or allies at the beginning of a war cannot yet be gauged. An atomic attack in a war already begun by other methods is far more likely than a blitz at the start.

5. What of Capital Cities?

An attacking nation can be fairly certain of reaching and destroying the civilian command center, the seat of government, with all its records and administrative personnel. Since the first atomic bomb exploded there has been some effort in most countries to decentralize, but governments are by their very nature concentrations. They probably will remain easy targets in an atomic blitz.

Yet there is no certainty that an attacker would strike at the seat of government. No nation can afford to ignore the grave handicaps the Germans brought on themselves by too-successful destruction of government machinery in Poland. None can overlook the wisdom of the United States' refusal to bomb the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.

The conqueror who has destroyed the civil government, its records and its authority, finds there is nobody left to surrender whose surrender means anything. When that happens the victor finds he has involved himself in a long, costly, painful guerrilla war. This would be the utter failure of atomic blitz.

It is unlikely, therefore, that quick victory will be sought by atom bombing of capitals. Such action would be avoided even in a long war except b an attacker who would not mind se ting up a police state and ruling th conquered country by the bayonet.

So the Answer Is—

It is, of course, quite impossible discuss an atomic blitzkrieg at a without considering its political a pects—what the user would expect accomplish in a military-politic sense as well as in the strictly str tegic realm.

The objective in most forms of wa is less destruction of the enemy tha forcing him to live and work und the victor's terms. There are exce tions.

In the famous war of extern nation against Paraguay, the armi of Argentina, Uruguay and Braz had to kill off nearly the whole ma population of that militant state. Ar Adolf Hitler deliberately tried to d stroy competing peoples in order make room for more Germans. It possible that dictatorships will ari in the future to whom the thought the 80,000 killed at Hiroshima will a pleasant rather than an unpleasa thought. Such a government wou not hesitate to use the atom bomb the fullest and most indiscrimina sense, as Hitler did not quail fro filling the road of France and Be gium with refugees and then machi gunning them.

The question then of the possibili of an atomic blitzkrieg being attemp ed is less one of technique than ideology, less one of the general ca than of the specific nations involve The attempt remains a possibility, more. The likelihood of success, atom bombing winning a quick a easy victory, is very slight.

UNW Book Reviews

By ANNE FREMANTLE



The Vital Center
by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company. $3.00.

Conservatism Revisited
by Peter Viereck. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. $2.50.

Men in Crisis
by Arnold Whitridge. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. $5.00.

Each year, as the fall publishing season's spate of books breaks upon the Average Reader, he will be aware, at least as he gets older and more inured to the inundation, of a kind of "general trend," a sort of *Zeitgeist*. Taking the last ten years along, this annual emphasis has run the gamut from showing a general concern with political ideologies, through strategy to economics, and then, as the world became more and more one vast hospital to psychology.

With recovery came an overall emphasis on mysticism and rather esoteric philosophy, and this year, it would seem as though the trend were historical. The waves of best-selling so-called historical novels have broken down reader-reaction, and conditioned the reading public for tougher fare, and here are three first rate, delightfully written, eminently readable, but quite definitely authoritative and important new books whose mode is history.

Dr. Schlesinger, all of 32, and a professor of history at Harvard, poses as the basis of his inquiry the question: Why is our free society on the brink of failure? What is it in the mechanism of human beings that makes them turn to totalitarianism, either Nazi or Fascist? The children at Dartington Hall, an ultra-progressive English school, besieged their teachers with a cry of "No more free choice! Please, no more free choice!" Dr. Schlesinger seeks to discover why adults in Europe, adults in Asia, and adults in America, made, or are making, the same complaint, and whence arises this weariness of their wills?

And because knowledge, like charity, begins at home, it is in the American scene that he seeks his answers. He first analyzes the failures of the Right: the failure of riches without responsibility, of power unaccounted for to the people, and obtained often in the first instance, in their despite. As an example, he cites the National Association of Manufacturers, which "in spite of the shame of an enlightened business minority . . . remains the characteristic expression of the capitalist libido."

Dr. Schlesinger does not mince his words: "terrified of change, lacking confidence and resolution, subject to spasms of panic and hysteria, the extreme right-wing elements keep the American business community in far too irresponsible a condition to work steadily for the national interest at home or abroad." And he includes what he calls the "Young Fogy movement" led by Harold Stassen, in his disapproval.

But the Left's failure he sees as no less grave. Between the wars, the conservatives have been in power in the United States, and their power has come to pieces in their hands. Their critics, therefore, those progressives who "create our contemporary climate of opinion" have been innocent: but is innocence enough? Dr. Schlesinger points out, that since the Fall, innocence is not only not enough: it is not, period. Official optimism, the sentimental belief in progress, the uplifting aura of what George Eliot called "meliorism," by which man is to be redeemed by the benevolent unfolding of history, have given all progressives a "soft and shallow" conception of human nature. For the

liberal's weakness is his fear of responsibility. Tail-less fox, he gladly renounces the power he hasn't got, and believes that all will be for the best when economic institutions are changed. When, in fact, only a redemptive change from within can be of the slightest avail.

Little wonder that so spineless a creature, seeking compensation in emotion, is a pushover for totalitarianism, whether of the right or of the left. Dr. Schlesinger notes the interchangeability of totalitarian personnel: Hitler used ex-Communists in key positions; the Communists in East Germany have happily put into power ex-Nazis. Fleeing their own loneliness, as Konstantin Simonov put it, men join the Party, and thus, as Goebbels put it, sacrifice the individual to the whole.

Perhaps the most telling passage in this tremendously alive book is where Dr. Schlesinger paraphrases the Grand Inquisitor scene from Dostoevsky, substituting Lincoln and Lenin for the original *dramatis personae.* The dialogue is magnificent, and the writer moves easily from this scene to a discussion of the restoration of the radical nerve, and of the techniques of freedom. He sees—and here Dr. Viereck agrees with him—nationalism as the greatest enemy, and the "presence" of Europe in its most acute form —that presence which André Malraux says is epitomized today by the painting of Picasso—as one of the most potent antidotes. And that presence, and not of Europe only, but of "one world," is with us here today at Lake Success, though Dr. Schlesinger nowhere mentions it. Yet, we are committed to it spiritually, as wholly as we are committed to "the struggle within our country against oppression and stagnation, and to the struggle within ourselves against pride and corruption." We have, to our credit, that "gusto of democracy, the underlying sense of comedy, which brooks no worship of authority because it knows that no man is that good." Finally, we must realize, as Etienne Gilson put it, that "not until the social order becomes the spontaneous expression of the interior peace in men's hearts shall we have tranquillity."

Dr. Peter Viereck, the young poet-professor who was given the Pulitzer Prize this year for his first book of verse, "Terror and Decorum," is to the right of Dr. Schlesinger, his junior by a year. For both, while the exterior villain is nationalism, the interior culprit is Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Noble-Savage. Our four-fold heritage, Jewish, Greek, Roman and Christian, had, by the middle of the 18th Century, four-squarely poisoned the aforementioned Noble-Savage, otherwise the original average-sensual-man. When Rousseau released him, boy, o, boy, did he not go and do more harm on his lonesome than all the evils in Pandora's box together.

Dr. Viereck's small but significant book begins with an essay on "The Revolt Against Revolt" and goes on to a discussion of the Union of Europe, which he sub-titles, "Some history lessons from Professor Metternich." Metternich's view of western oneness (he wrote in a letter to Wellington, "Europe has long since become my native country") was held tenaciously throughout his lifetime against the "terrible simplificators" such as Jahn and Ardt, with their *mystique* of Folk and Blood, their goose-stepping young men, their hatred of Latin or Slav. In a universe governed by Euclid's law that the whole is no greater than the sum of its parts, patriotism must, Dr. Viereck insists, keep its place.

Dr. Schlesinger begins by asking a question; Dr. Viereck ends upon one. "In the light of two World Wars of nationalism, we must choose at last; is western man's 'native country' to be an ever-broadening community of humanity, or is it to be some narrowly and meanly provincial 'nation'?" Since Hiroshima, surely, the answer is as obvious as it is imperative. It is only a pity that Dr. Viereck, because of his historical framework is so continent-poor in his concepts. The future of western man flows as surely upon the Yangtze and the Amazon today, as upon Jordan, Tiber or Thames.

Mr. Whitridge uses history to point his moral as well as to adorn his tale. The events of our times, he suggests, "may become more endurable, if we occasionally step back into an age not less chaotic than ours, that was struggling, just as we are, to find a working definition of the word 'freedom'." Mr. Whitridge views and discusses in terms of individuals the various revolutions and counter-revolutions that were taking place in Europe just a hundred and one years ago. France is represented by Louis-Philippe, Lamartine and Louis-Napoleon; Italy by Mazzini and Garibaldi; Germany by Karl Marx, and Austria by Metternich; Hungary by Szechenyi and Kossuth. Mr. Whitridge shows, too, the repercussions of all these upheavels upon America: he estimates the contribution of the half-million foreign born volunteers in the Union Army on the winning of the Civil War as well as upon the opening up of the West. He deals at length with Carl Schurz, too, and with the 'capital' brought in by the immigrants." He too, ends upon a query, not his own but that of the English historian G. M. Macaulay: why did history, having reached the turning point of 1848, fail to turn? Why did these revolutions fail?

These three books, in spite of their differing stresses, ask essential questions. And, as Mr. T. S. Eliot says "the answers, we know all the answers; it is the questions that we do not know."

by Drew Middleton. New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company. $3.00.

Mr. Drew Middleton writes to demonstrate that Germany is the "most important single problem of American foreign policy, and that the fate of the world may rest on the direction which Germany takes." He writes from inside Germany, and from a profound knowledge of present conditions there. From 1939 to 1945 he was war correspondent, first for the

Associated Press and then for *The New York Times* and, as he put it "at the receiving end of German nationalism." In 1945 he was in Germany for a year, and in May, 1946, he was sent to the Soviet Union. Since April, 1948, he has been uninterruptedly in Germany, as chief correspondent for *The New York Times.*

Mr. Middleton is a practical man. Of the Morgenthau plan he says tersely: "Politics is the art of the possible. The Morgenthau plan did not come within the boundaries of this art." He is also inclined to be a pessimist. Four years of introspection had not, he found, shown the Germans that war was wrong, but only that losing it was. Russia, for him, has in the past four years not only betrayed her own revolution, but the cause of the working classes all over the world. When the Allies first went into Germany, the danger of a German revival was remote, but not because the German nature had changed. By dividing the Allies, by appealing to the Americans, who did not know them, but found them "like us, on wheels" and "like us," clean and cozy, against the French and the British who knew them only to well, the Germans have proved again the truth of Æsop's woodcutter, who showed his sons that a faggot could not be broken but that, untied, each stick was easily snapped.

"You can't forcibly feed freedom," concludes Mr. Middleton, and quotes an Erlangen student who told him, "The German is too unstable for your democracy." He dates "the end of collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, and the start of . . . the cold war," from the decision taken sometime in 1945 by the Politburo to "press and emphasize the revolutionary and destructive elements in Marxism and Leninism as they apply to the capitalist and enemy world." This, affirms the somewhat lugubrious Mr. Middleton, "meant the end of the United Nations as an effective instrument," although he concedes that for some time after that the US "still seemed to believe that the United Nations provided a fairly reliable medium for the settlement of international problems." Mr. Truman, when he announced that the Russians also had the bomb, still seemed to harbor some vestiges of this belief.

The re-emergence of Germany as an economic power is spectacular. Already by 1947, the output of West Germany was 40 per cent of that of 1938 (= 100), and in 1948 the Western Zone's output was 64 per cent, the Soviet Zone's, 61 per cent. This recovery, according to both Mr. Middleton and the Economic Survey of Europe put out by the Economic and Social Council of UN, was made possible by improved supplies of raw materials from abroad, and by the restoration of incentives following upon the monetary reform. Other statistics of Mr. Middleton are more alarming: That, for example, by 1949, 83 per cent of the judges, and 81 per cent of the prosecutors in the Bavarian courts were former Nazis. We need Germany, Mr. Middleton agrees, in the western community of nations. But not the Germany of Hitler. "A Fascist Germany is a false reinforcement to the democratic powers." But he does not hold out much hope that any other is probable, or possible.

by Jack Belden. New York, Harper & Brothers. $5.00.

On VJ Day, the Japanese Army, unbeaten, surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who had pursued it long and unsuccessfully. When the Allies withdrew, he had an army of 4 million, with 39 American-trained divisions, the biggest airforce any Asiatic mainland power ever had, and undisputed sway over 450,000,000 people. The Western powers returned the treaty port concessions and, reversing a hundred years of policy, recognized China as a wholly sovereign and independent power. In less than 4 years Chiang Kai-shek had fled his capital, was unblushingly beseeching the US "to revive the unequal treaties and establish military and naval bases in China" while his wife was on a begging expedition of her own in Washington, D.C. How did this happen, and why? Jack Belden, who returned to China at the end of 1946, offers his explanation. He scathingly describes the misuse everywhere of UNRRA, not only of food and supplies, but also of personnel, as witness Dr. Harrison, shunted with his freight train of aid to a lonely siding in the Yellow River flood area by Kuomintang officials and left to die. UNRRA sold coal to the National Fuel Commission at Taiwan for $5.25 a ton, and it appeared later on the black market at $130. UNRRA brought 120,000 tons of fertilizer to Formosa and handed it over to Chiang's officials at 8 yen a pound; it was next seen (paid for by the American taxpayer) at 160 yen a pound on the black market. But graft, grab and black markets, like boils and sores on the physical body, are effects, not causes. Jack Belden's book suffers from a tendency to catalogue the obvious minutiae of decomposition, while neglecting the radical causes of decay.

"United Nations 1950" "Inter American Calendar 1950"

Pictorial Engagement Calendars, New York, R. J. Birnback Associates. $1.25 each.

The United Nations calendar, this year, depicts the UN in action. The fifty excellent photos and the resumé of the important events in the history of the United Nations are supplemented by the text of the Declaration of Human Rights and the alphabetical listing of all member nations with their areas and populations.

Kurt Singer handles the text extremely well. The introduction is by Clark Eichelberger.

The Inter American Calendar is printed both in English and in Spanish. The selection of the 52 splendid pictures is a compliment to the artistic taste of Kurt Severin. Dr. A. Ramon Ruiz introduces the book with the warm appeal of a Good Neighbor.

An Editorial by Louis Dolivet

Heroes of Unanimity

President Truman, Ambassador Santa Cruz of Chile, and Pavel Chernyshev of the USSR, together wrote on Friday, October the 14th, 1949, one of the great pages in the history of mankind.

In the midst of a dark world picture wherein the fear of man-made holocaust saddens the eyes of the still living—a ray of hope has appeared. Frail and tender, like all sunrays penetrating the deep darkness, threatening to die as soon as the source of light is closed off—the new hope born in the United Nations a few days ago may still disappear.

But at the time of birth, we should never think of death. And so today, we take deep into our hearts the new promise of a better life for hundreds of millions of human beings in the poorest parts of the earth.

Like all truly great events in human life, the unanimous vote of the Economic and Financial Committee of the United Nations adopting the program of worldwide assistance to under-developed areas came without undue fanfare—almost as a surprise. In the sober atmosphere of a regular working day, while in other committees accusations of bad faith and sinister intrigue were being hurled back and forth, this Committee made a dream come to life twice.

First it brought into being the centuries-old aspiration of humans to help their fellow-men for no other reason than the joy of giving. For the resolution attaches no strings that bind the peoples who are to be assisted. It wants from them no concessions, no servitude. The only duty they undertake is to help themselves as much as they can, and tell the supreme body of mankind, the United Nations, what help they need other peoples to give them.

Second came to life the dream of unanimity—the dream that soldiers had on the battlefields in the last hours before they died, that the men of the Resistance movements carried proudly in their hearts as they marched to their torture and death chambers. They had been told a thousand times by the Allied leaders that their supreme sacrifice would result in a better and more united mankind. That promise has not yet been kept. But the vote on Friday, October 14th, is the first great step toward its realization.

One wonders which is more important in this decision: the help to under-developed areas, or the unanimity of the vote of all the countries of the earth.

From a moral and economic point of view, probably the program of assistance is more important. For it will establish new ties of brotherhood across the continents, and it will open a new era of great economic opportunities for the exchange of goods and world trade in the service of peace.

From a political point of view, the unanimous character of the vote surpasses by far in importance even the assistance to under-developed areas itself.

The unanimous vote is a new bridge between East West.

The Soviet world, which had rejected the Marshall Plan, is accepting the Truman Plan. This should prove to the Russians that the American leaders are not as bad as they are said to be, and should also prove to the Americans that the Russian leaders can sometimes say "yes," too.

There are many heroes who have had their part in bringing about this first great unanimity. Delegations from many lands have labored hard, day and night, to conciliate opposing points of view. The Secretariats of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies have done a magnificent job in preparing the necessary documentation. But in the front line of history three men stand out:

> Harry S. Truman, President of the USA, in whose heart and mind the idea was born, when he announced the now-famous Point Four, laid the foundation for the UN's new program;
>
> Hernan Santa Cruz, Chairman of Committee II, forgetting all his old struggles with the Russians on many a controversial matter, rose to the heights of impartiality, and brought the long negotiations to a successful conclusion;
>
> Pavel Chernyshev of the Soviet Union, who played well throughout the negotiations the game of "give and take"—which is the only reasonable method in international conferences—by his final vote made unanimity for constructive world action possible.

The road to the world of tomorrow is still strewn with innumerable obstacles, but the going may be somewhat easier. The UN must take hold of this first unanimity and place the best men there are on earth at the helm of the gigantic program agreed upon.

From successful assistance to the under-developed areas, the United Nations must move to establishing peace for the developed areas.

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

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

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









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